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ABSTRACT 
 
The study of video games and morality has emerged only recently. Thus far, research has 
examined the topic through the lens of moral foundations theory and moral disengagement 
theory. Generally, these lines of research have found that players often treat in-game behavior as 
morally significant as long as the behavior is considered morally relevant and the player is not 
morally disengaged. Another nascent domain of research concerns video games and 
identification with in-game avatars. This area has found that video games can temporarily alter 
implicit and explicit self-concepts to be more similar to the characters or roles that are played in 
video games. Moreover, this self-other merging may have important implications for real-world 
behaviors. The present study synthesized these three lines of research by utilizing a 2 (moral 
disengagement: unjustified violence/justified violence) x 2 (avatar identification: low/high) 
design with explicit and implicit guilt as the primary outcome variables. 
It was predicted that player experience of guilt would be stronger when participants 
carried out unjustified (as compared to justified) violence (H1), and this effect would be 
especially pronounced in the high identification condition (H2). Moreover, it was predicted that 
this effect would only occur for players who consider the in-game behavior to be morally 
relevant (H3). Finally, it was expected that player experience of guilt would yield short-term 
increases in the salience of violated moral foundations. When a continuous measure of similarity 
identification was used instead of the experimentally manipulated avatar identification factor, 
results supported H2 for explicit guilt. Participants who carried out unjustified violence were 
more likely to experience guilt if they felt similar to their in-game avatars, but feeling similar to 
one’s avatar had no effect on the likelihood of experiencing guilt for players who carried out 
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justified violence. Familiarity with the game that was played also reduced the likelihood of 
experiencing guilt. These effects were not found for implicit guilt. No other hypotheses were 
supported.
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CHAPTER 1.   INTRODUCTION 
 
 Video games have become immensely popular but the full extent of their impact on 
society remains a mystery. Some important questions have been answered. For example, 
much of previous research concerning video games has focused on one controversial 
question: Do violent video games increase aggression? Recent meta-analyses (Anderson et 
al., 2010; Greitemeyer & Mügge, 2014) provide some of the most compelling evidence to 
answer this question, and the answer appears to be a resounding yes. Specifically, Anderson 
et al. (2010) found that violent video game play was linked to increased aggressive behavior, 
aggressive affect, and aggressive cognition, as well as decreased empathy and prosocial 
behavior. Moreover, these results were consistent for experimental, correlational, and 
longitudinal studies in both Eastern and Western cultures. 
Video game effects are not always negative, though. Greitemeyer and Mügge (2014) 
conducted a more recent meta-analysis that replicated many of the findings of Anderson et al. 
(2010), but also examined the effects of prosocial video games on social outcomes. Results 
indicated that the effects of prosocial video games were essentially the opposite of violent 
games. Specifically, prosocial video game play was associated with decreased aggressive 
behavior, aggressive cognition, and aggressive affect, as well as increased prosocial 
behavior, prosocial cognition, and prosocial affect. Thus, video games affect players in 
socially important ways by altering behavior, cognitions, and affect. The direction of these 
effects, however, depends on the game content, meaning that games can be both “good” and 
“evil.” This “double-edged sword” quality of video games makes understanding their effects 
all the more important—especially given their staggering popularity. 
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A recent trend in video game research has shifted from the video game violence 
debate to the relatively unexplored domain of video games and morality. Thus far, research 
in this area can be roughly divided into two categories. One line of research has examined 
video games and morality through the lens of moral foundations theory (Dogruel, Joeckel, & 
Bowman, 2013; Grizzard, Tamborini, Lewis, Wang, & Prabhu, 2014; Joeckel, Bowman, & 
Dogruel, 2012, 2013; Weaver & Lewis, 2012), while another line of research has examined 
video games and morality through the lens of moral disengagement theory (Bowman, 
Schultheiss, & Schumann, 2012; Gabbiadini, Andrighetto, & Volpato, 2012; Gabbiadini, 
Riva, Andrighetto, Volpato, & Bushman, 2014; Gollwitzer & Melzer, 2012; Hartmann, Toz, 
& Brandon, 2010; Hartmann & Vorderer, 2010; Klimmt, Schmid, Nosper, Hartmann, & 
Vorderer, 2006; Lin, 2011; Shafer, 2012). A separate domain of research has recently 
developed to examine the effects of avatar1 identification in video games (Bluemke, 
Friedrich, & Zumbach, 2010; Fischer et al., 2009; Fischer, Kastenmüller, & Greitemeyer, 
2010; Klimmt, Dorothée, & Peter, 2009; Klimmt, Hefner, Vorderer, Roth, & Blake, 2010; 
Konijn, Bijvank, & Bushman, 2007; Lewis, Weber, & Bowman, 2008; Uhlmann & Swanson, 
2004). The present study synthesized these three lines of research by examining the effect of 
avatar identification and opponent type on player experience of guilt. 
                                                 
1 Although the terms avatar and character are often used interchangeably, the word avatar will be used 
throughout because it emphasizes the fact that player-controlled video game characters serve as projections of 
the player. 
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CHAPTER 2.   LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Video Games and Moral Foundations 
 Moral Foundations Theory (MFT; Graham et al., 2012) is a pluralistic, dual-process 
approach to morality rooted in evolutionary theory. MFT proposes that people are 
evolutionarily prepared to learn certain moral values, norms, and behaviors, creating a “first 
draft” of morality that is later edited by culture. Those values, norms, and behaviors fall into 
five distinct moral domains (or foundations). The five foundations described by the most 
recent account2 of MFT include the care/harm foundation (concerned with caring and 
kindness), the fairness/cheating foundation (concerned with fairness, justice, and 
trustworthiness), the loyalty/betrayal foundation (concerned with loyalty, patriotism, and 
self-sacrifice), the authority/subversion foundation (concerned with obedience and 
deference), and the sanctity/degradation foundation (concerned with temperance, chastity, 
piety, and cleanliness). The pluralistic approach of MFT emphasizes that different people 
endorse different moral foundations. If an individual strongly endorses a moral foundation, 
then that foundation is a salient part of that individual’s moral system and behaviors related 
to that foundation will be judged as moral or immoral. If an individual does not endorse a 
moral foundation, however, then the foundation is not salient and behaviors concerning that 
foundation are considered morally irrelevant. 
According to MFT, moral judgment occurs in two stages: people have an immediate, 
automatic intuition, or “gut” feeling about the morality of a situation followed by more 
deliberative moral reasoning (which is often motivated by a desire to support our intuitions). 
                                                 
2 Previous versions of MFT used the labels harm/care, fairness/reciprocity, ingroup/loyalty, authority/respect, 
and purity/sanctity. 
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Each moral foundation is associated with different emotional reactions to morally relevant 
situations. For example, the care/harm foundation is associated with compassion for victims 
and anger at perpetrators whereas the fairness/cheating foundation is associated with anger, 
gratitude, and guilt. 
Research utilizing MFT to understand video games and morality has found that most 
video game players treat morally relevant in-game decisions as they would real-life moral 
decisions. Weaver and Lewis (2012) found that participants’ endorsement of the care/harm 
and authority/subversion foundations significantly predicted in-game decisions relevant to 
each domain (i.e., greater endorsement led to fewer moral violations). Moreover, the majority 
of participants (68%) said that they made the same decision that they would in real-life. 
Other experiments have shown that, in most cases, players are less likely to violate3 a 
highly salient moral foundation in-game. This pattern has been found for elderly American 
and German participants (Dogruel et al., 2013; Joeckel et al., 2012), and adolescent German, 
but not American participants (Joeckel et al., 2012, 2013). When a moral foundation is not 
salient, most players are equally likely to uphold or violate that moral foundation in-game. 
This pattern has been found for elderly American, but not German participants (Joeckel et al., 
2012), as well as American and German adolescents (Joeckel et al., 2012, 2013). Although 
further research is needed to explain why the effects did not emerge for all combinations of 
age group and culture, taken together, these findings suggest that in-game behaviors are 
considered morally significant if they are relevant to a salient moral foundation. If in-game 
                                                 
3 In the studies discussed in this paragraph, it is important to note that participants chose to either encourage or 
discourage a computer-controlled character to violate moral foundations rather than upholding or violating 
foundations with their own avatars. It is possible that the observed patterns would be even more pronounced if 
participants were upholding or violating foundations themselves. 
5 
 
behavior is relevant to a non-salient moral foundation, the behavior is considered morally 
insignificant. 
MFT has also been expanded upon to explain the relation between moral foundations 
and media appeal. Tamborini’s model of intuitive morality and exemplars (MIME; 
Tamborini, 2011; Tamborini et al., 2013) proposes that people are drawn to media that 
satisfactorily exemplify their salient moral foundations. The model also suggests, however, 
that the salience of moral foundations can be altered by media exposure. In line with this 
suggestion, the most recent research concerning video games and MFT found that violating 
the care/harm and fairness/cheating domains (via unjustified video game violence) increased 
the salience of these domains, and this effect was mediated by guilt (Grizzard et al., 2014). 
This finding suggests that virtual violations of moral foundations may morally sensitize 
players (at least temporarily). Following the MIME, repeated exposure to games that 
emphasize a particular moral foundation may also increase the salience of that foundation for 
players over time. 
Video Games and Moral Disengagement 
 Moral disengagement theory (Bandura, 1999, 2002) posits that there are a variety of 
strategies that people may adopt to reduce the moral significance of immoral behavior. In 
total, eight strategies of moral disengagement are proposed. Three strategies focus on 
cognitively reframing reprehensible conduct as acceptable. Moral justification occurs when 
individuals justify immoral behavior by claiming that it is in the service of some greater 
societal or moral good (e.g., killing in the name of God). Euphemistic language allows 
immoral conduct to be sanitized through word choice (e.g., “neutralizing targets” instead of 
“killing people”). Advantageous comparison occurs when people reframe immoral conduct 
6 
 
as relatively benign compared to other behaviors (e.g., “I may be a thief, but I’m no killer”). 
Two strategies focus on reducing individual responsibility for immoral behavior. 
Responsibility can be displaced as occurs when followers place moral blame on leaders (e.g., 
“I was just following orders”), or when leaders remain intentionally ignorant of the immoral 
conduct of their followers (e.g., maintaining plausible deniability). Responsibility can also be 
diffused, as occurs when tasks are subdivided, group decisions are made, or collective action 
is taken. Another strategy allows individuals to psychologically distance themselves from the 
harm they have caused by ignoring or distorting the consequences of their behavior. Finally, 
two strategies focus on altering perceptions of the victims of immoral behavior, making it 
easier to treat them cruelly. Dehumanization strips victims of their human qualities, or even 
worse, bestows them with bestial or demonic qualities. Attribution of blame can also be 
shifted so that situations or victims are held responsible for immoral behavior. 
 Video game research has also revealed two game-level strategies of moral 
disengagement (Klimmt et al., 2006). Players can morally disengage by reminding 
themselves that what they are playing is just a game (and thus morally irrelevant) or by 
justifying their immoral behaviors as byproducts of competition (e.g., killing to win). Within 
Bandura’s moral disengagement framework, the former strategy is a form of ignoring or 
distorting consequences (e.g., “it’s just a game and it isn’t real, so no real harm is done”) and 
the latter strategy includes elements of both displacement of responsibility (e.g., “it is ‘kill or 
be killed’ in this game and I am just following the rules”) and attribution of blame (e.g., “my 
opponent chose to compete knowing the consequences”). The use of any of the above 
strategies (alone or combined) can lead to moral disengagement and allow one to evade the 
negative emotional consequences of immoral behavior. 
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 A small number of studies have examined the relation between video games and 
moral disengagement (although not always explicitly). Similar to moral foundations research, 
some studies have shown that moral disengagement within a video game context is 
associated with immoral or antisocial behavior in video games. Shafer (2012) found that 
82.9% of morally activated players (i.e., players who did not utilize any moral 
disengagement strategies) chose prototypically “good” decisions over prototypically “evil” 
decisions in-game. In contrast, 64.3% of morally disengaged players (i.e., those who used at 
least one moral disengagement strategy) chose “evil” over “good” decisions. Another study 
found that massively multiplayer online role-playing game (MMORPG) players who felt less 
responsible for their in-game character had greater antisocial gaming motivations (i.e., they 
were more interested in playing to anger or upset other players; Bowman et al., 2012). It is 
important to note, however, that there is no clear causal direction for either of these studies. 
 Other studies have provided support for the notion that in-game behaviors can be 
morally significant. Hartmann and Vorderer (2010) found that players who engaged in 
unjustified virtual violence (as compared to justified virtual violence) felt guiltier and 
experienced greater overall negative affect, but this effect was attenuated by the extent to 
which participants believed it was “just a game,” supporting the game-level mechanism of 
moral disengagement. Hartmann et al. (2010) found a similar relation between unjustified 
virtual violence and guilt, with empathetic players exhibiting especially strong guilt 
responses. 
The current findings concerning dehumanization are mixed. Hartmann and Vorderer 
(2010) found no significant effect of opponent type (human vs. inhuman) on player 
experience of guilt, but this may have been due to the attenuating effect of participants’ 
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familiarity with the selected game (those who were more familiar experienced less guilt, 
suggesting a possible game-level moral disengagement mechanism). In contrast, Hartmann et 
al. (2010) found that players who were provided humanizing information about in-game 
assassination targets felt guiltier after assassination than players who received no humanizing 
information. Similarly, Lin (2011) found that players who aggressed against human 
opponents felt guiltier than players who aggressed against inhuman zombies. Finally, 
Gollwitzer and Melzer (2012) found that inexperienced video game players who played a 
violent video game (as compared to a nonviolent game) felt more morally distressed and 
selected more hygiene products to take home (suggestive of moral cleansing as a result of 
guilt). Experienced players felt equally morally distressed and selected equivalent numbers of 
hygiene products in violent and nonviolent game conditions. This suggests that experienced 
gamers may be more adept at moral disengagement while gaming. 
 A final set of studies suggests that immoral behavior in video games may increase the 
general tendency to morally disengage and influence real-world immoral behavior. 
Gabbiadini et al. (2012) found that for adolescent participants, recency of exposure to a 
specific violent video game (Grand Theft Auto) predicted a greater readiness to resort to 
moral justification, advantageous comparison, diffusion of responsibility, and distorting 
consequences for justifying immoral conduct. Frequency of exposure only predicted a greater 
readiness to use advantageous comparison and neither recency nor frequency predicted the 
use of dehumanization. Building off of this finding, Gabbiadini et al. (2014) experimentally 
linked violent video game play to the subsequent real-world immoral behavior of 
adolescents. Specifically, playing an antisocial violent video game (relative to a nonviolent 
video game) decreased self-control, increased cheating, and increased aggressive behavior. 
9 
 
This effect was especially pronounced for participants who scored highly on a general 
measure of moral disengagement. 
 Altogether, this line of research suggests that in-game behavior is considered morally 
significant unless a player is morally disengaged. Moreover, immoral behavior in video 
games (especially violent video games) appears to be linked to general willingness to morally 
disengage which may in turn influence real-world immoral behavior. 
Video Games and Avatar Identification 
 Recently, a new domain of research has emerged to explore the possible effects of 
identification with video game avatars. Though not yet as well-established as moral 
foundations theory or moral disengagement theory, Klimmt et al. (2009) have offered a 
theoretical account of identification with video game avatars. They propose that avatar 
identification is a temporary alteration in a player’s self-concept that merges characteristics 
of the avatar with concepts of the self. Additionally, if a video game allows players to reduce 
the discrepancy between their actual and idealized selves through identification, then that 
game should be especially enjoyable. 
 Research thus far has supported Klimmt et al.'s (2009) theory of self-other merging. 
For example, Uhlmann and Swanson (2004) found that after playing a violent video game (as 
compared to a nonviolent video game), participants were more likely to implicitly associate 
themselves with aggressive concepts. Similarly, Bluemke et al. (2010) found that playing a 
violent game (as compared to a peaceful game) increased participants’ implicitly measured 
aggressive self-concepts. For males, playing a peaceful game also reduced aggressive self-
concepts more than playing an abstract game or simply reading. In both of the above studies, 
playing a violent compared to a nonviolent game had no effect on self-reported trait 
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aggressiveness, suggesting that explicit self-concept had not changed (at least not 
drastically). Klimmt et al. (2010) found further support for the divide between implicit and 
explicit self-associations. Participants randomly assigned to play a racing game had a 
significantly different pattern of implicit self-associations than participants assigned to play a 
military game. Those who played the racing game implicitly associated themselves with 
racing concepts and those who played the military game implicitly associated themselves 
with military concepts. Implicit self-associations were only weakly associated with explicit 
identification, however (rs < .12). 
 Other research has suggested that the self-other merging process of avatar 
identification may have important behavioral implications. In four experimental studies, 
Fischer et al. (2009) found that participants who played risk-rewarding street-racing games 
(as compared to non-risk-rewarding racing games and non-racing neutral games) explicitly 
perceived themselves as more reckless drivers and were more likely to take risks in simulated 
traffic situations. This effect disappeared when participants merely observed another 
participant playing the risk-rewarding street-racing game, suggesting that it is important for 
an individual to be in control of the play experience for effects to occur. Another study by 
Fischer et al. (2010) found that participants who played an aggressive game with a 
personalized avatar (i.e., an avatar made to look like the participant) behaved more 
aggressively than participants who played the same game with a default avatar, and 
participants in both of these conditions behaved more aggressively than those who played a 
nonaggressive game with either a personalized or default avatar. Similarly, Konijn, Bijvank, 
and Bushman (2007) found that participants who played a violent game and wishfully 
identified with the game protagonist (i.e., wanted to be more like that character) behaved 
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more aggressively than participants who played the same game but did not wishfully identify. 
Participants who played the violent game also behaved more aggressively than those who 
played a nonviolent game. 
 Overall, recent research on video games and avatar identification suggests that video 
games can alter our implicit and explicit self-concepts (at least in the short term) and may 
also have important behavioral implications. The recent research concerning both risky 
driving and aggression suggests that avatar identification may augment the effects of video 
games. In other words, if video games act as a double-edged sword with positive and 
negative effects depending on content, then the emerging picture is that avatar identification 
acts as a sharpening stone for that sword by strengthening content effects. 
The Present Research 
 The present study synthesized the three lines of research discussed above using a 2 
(moral disengagement: unjustified violence/justified violence) x 2 (avatar identification: 
low/high) experimental design with explicit and implicit guilt as the primary dependent 
variables. Participants played a video game as an avatar that they should or should not 
identify with and were provided with moral engagement cues (i.e., fighting against 
humanized opponents for unjust reasons) or moral disengagement cues (i.e., fighting against 
dehumanized opponents for just reasons) to create conditions of unjustified and justified 
violence (respectively). Based upon moral disengagement theory and the findings of 
Hartmann et al. (2010) and Lin (2011), I predicted that players in the unjustified violence 
condition would feel guiltier than those in the justified violence condition (H1) because 
fighting against dehumanized opponents for a just cause should be sufficient to elicit moral 
disengagement whereas fighting against humanized opponents for an unjust cause should at 
12 
 
least discourage moral disengagement and at most encourage moral engagement. Based upon 
identification research in general, and the suggested augmentation effect found by Fischer et 
al. (2009, 2010) and Konijn et al. (2007) specifically, I predicted an interaction such that 
guilt would be highest for players in the high identification condition who engaged in 
unjustified violence (H2). Based upon moral foundations theory, I predicted that the expected 
effects would only occur for participants who endorse the care/harm and fairness/cheating 
foundations (H3). If the player does not believe that others should be protected from harm 
and treated fairly, then aggressing against opponents should not be considered morally 
significant and should not lead to guilt. Finally, based upon the findings of Grizzard et al. 
(2014), I predicted that player experience of guilt would lead to short-term changes in the 
salience of violated moral foundations (i.e., the care/harm and fairness/cheating foundations; 
H4). 
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CHAPTER 3.   METHOD 
 
Design 
 A 2 (moral disengagement: unjustified violence/justified violence) x 2 (avatar 
identification: low/high) between-participants design was utilized with explicit and implicit 
guilt as the primary dependent variables and sacredness of the care/harm and 
fairness/cheating moral foundations as secondary dependent variables. Participants were 
blocked by sex and randomly assigned to one of the four conditions so that each condition 
would be represented equally for males and females. 
A subset of the sample (25.40%) also completed a measure of care/harm and 
fairness/cheating moral foundation salience outside of the lab experiment during a mass 
testing or scale validation session.4 The influence of out-of-lab moral foundation salience on 
experimental outcomes was assessed by including the salience of relevant moral foundations 
as covariates in the relevant analyses. If these measures emerge as significant covariates then 
there is evidence that the player’s sense of morality does influence his or her experience of 
guilt. 
Participants 
IRB approval was obtained before recruiting participants (see Appendix A). The 
initial sample consisted of 417 undergraduates at a large Midwestern university who 
participated in exchange for course credit. All participants were told that the experiment 
                                                 
4 Although the original intention was to require all participants to have completed these measures outside of the 
lab before participating in the experiment, this requirement severely limited rates of participation and was thus 
removed. It was expected that most participants would end up completing the measures during a mass testing or 
scale validation session even without the requirement, but unfortunately this expectation was not met. Thus, the 
sample size for analyses utilizing the out-of-lab measures of morality were greatly reduced. Although this is an 
obviously undesirable situation, it was decided that reducing the sample size for one of the four hypotheses was 
a better choice than reducing the sample size for all hypotheses by limiting participant recruitment. 
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concerned video games and product desirability in order to mask the true hypotheses (see 
informed consent form in Appendix B). In total, 39 participants were excluded because they 
did not experience the intended experimental manipulation, had participated more than once, 
or had problematically-high levels of suspicion. Thirteen of these participants had video 
game modifications loaded improperly, meaning they either played as the wrong avatar or 
fought against the wrong enemies. Most of these occurrences were attributable to a bug in the 
game that was discovered and dealt with early in the experiment. However, some were due to 
experimenter errors. Seven participants were excluded because their gameplay recordings 
revealed that they never fought any enemies (or in one participant’s case, fought and killed 
only one enemy).5 One participant was removed because they escaped from the intended 
game area and did not explore the cave or fight the intended enemies. One participant was 
excluded due to a procedural error (i.e., the experimenter gave them the wrong description of 
in-game goals), two were excluded for not following instructions (e.g., completing the survey 
before gameplay), and one was excluded because he reported to the experimenter that he had 
participated in the experiment before. Examination of student ID numbers (used to match in-
the-lab data to out-of-the-lab data for some participants) revealed five additional instances of 
repeat participation (these participants did not let experimenters know that they had 
previously participated). For each of these cases, the data from the repeat participation were 
excluded, reducing the sample by five. Finally, nine participants were excluded for high 
levels of suspicion regarding experimental hypotheses (three guessed or knew the true 
                                                 
5 Interestingly, none of these seven participants were in the justified violence + low identification condition. All 
other conditions were roughly equally represented though: two were in the unjustified violence + high 
identification condition, two were in the justified violence + high identification condition, and three were in the 
unjustified violence + low identification condition. All seven participants were female. 
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purpose of the study and six had a specific suspicion that was likely to affect the results).6 
After these exclusions, 378 participants remained: 263 males (69.6%) and 115 females 
(30.4%). The average age was 19.49 years old (SD = 1.55), ranging from 18 to 33.7 There 
were 86 participants in the unjustified violence + low identification condition (22.8%), 98 
participants in the unjustified violence + high identification condition (25.9%), 95 
participants in the justified violence + low identification condition (25.1%), and 99 
participants in the justified violence + high identification condition (26.2%). 
A subsample of 96 participants completed measures of moral foundation salience 
outside of the lab. There were 61 males (63.5%) and 35 females (36.5%) with an average age 
of 19.34 years (SD = 1.51), ranging from 18 to 28 years old. There were 16 participants in the 
unjustified violence + low identification condition (16.7%), 30 participants in the unjustified 
violence + high identification condition (31.3%), 22 participants in the justified violence + 
low identification condition (22.9%), and 28 participants in the justified violence + high 
identification condition (29.2%).  
Materials and Measures 
Moral Foundations Salience 
The moral profile of those who completed measures outside of the lab was assessed 
with the 30-item Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ30; Graham et al., 2011). Obtaining 
this measure outside of the lab helped maintain the cover story and provided a “baseline” 
measure of moral foundations (i.e., a measure unaffected by experimental manipulations). 
                                                 
6 Seven of these nine participants were in one of the two unjustified violence conditions (four in the high 
identification condition and three in the low identification condition). The remaining two participants were in 
the justified violence conditions (one in the high identification condition and one in the low identification 
condition). 
7 One participant reported being 2 years old. This obviously erroneous value was deleted and replaced with the 
mean age for all other participants. 
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Obtaining a measure outside of the lab context was preferable because previous research has 
suggested that the salience of moral foundations may temporarily change after in-game moral 
violations (Grizzard et al., 2014). 
 The MFQ30 measures the degree to which individuals endorse five distinct moral 
domains: care/harm, fairness/cheating, loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, and 
sanctity/degradation. Higher scores indicate greater endorsement or foundation salience. The 
first portion of the questionnaire asks participants how relevant different considerations are to 
their decisions of whether something is right or wrong (0 = not at all relevant, 5 = extremely 
relevant). Three considerations are offered for each domain. Examples include: Whether or 
not… “someone suffered emotionally” (care/harm), “some people were treated differently 
than others” (fairness/cheating), “someone’s action showed love for his or her country” 
(loyalty/betrayal), “someone showed a lack of respect for authority” (authority/subversion), 
and “someone violated standards of purity and decency” (sanctity/degradation). This portion 
also includes a “catch” item designed to filter out inattentive participants (“Whether or not 
someone was good at math”). 
 The second portion of the MFQ30 asks participants the extent to which they agree (1 
= strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree) with 15 domain-relevant statements (three per 
domain). Example statements include: “Compassion for those who are suffering is the most 
crucial virtue” (care/harm), “Justice is the most important requirement for a society” 
(fairness/cheating), “I am proud of my country’s history” (loyalty/betrayal), “Respect for 
authority is something all children need to learn” (authority/subversion), and “Chastity is an 
important and valuable virtue” (sanctity/degradation). This portion includes an additional 
“catch” item to filter inattentive participants (“It is better to do good than to do bad”). Scores 
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on the six relevant items for each foundation (from both portions of the MFQ) are averaged 
to serve as the measure of moral foundation salience. Higher scores indicate greater salience 
or endorsement of that foundation. In the current study, the subscales had the following 
internal consistencies (as measured by α): care/harm = .57, fairness/cheating = .61, 
loyalty/betrayal = .64, authority/subversion = .61, and sanctity/degradation = .72. Although 
these values are low, it is unfortunately common for measures of moral foundations to have 
reliabilities in this range (see, for example: Graham et al., 2011; Graham & Haidt, 2012; 
Grizzard et al., 2014; Tamborini et al., 2013). Descriptive statistics for this measure (and all 
other measures of interest) are provided in Appendix C. 
Video Game 
Participants played a modified version of The Elder Scrolls V: Skyrim, a popular 
fantasy action role-playing game (Bethesda Game Studios, 2011). Skyrim gives players the 
ability to extensively customize their avatar, choosing from 10 fictional humanoid races 
ranging in appearance from prototypically-human representations to fantastical avatars with 
elven8, orcish9, reptilian, or feline appearances. After selecting avatar race, players can 
further customize by changing sex, skin tone, weight, facial structure (e.g., eyes, ears, and 
nose), skin tone, hair, facial hair, hair color, complexion, and battle scars/tattoos. The avatar 
creation system also includes several predesigned avatars for each race that vary along the 
dimensions mentioned above. Finally, players can choose a name for their avatar. 
In the high identification condition, participants were asked to create an avatar that 
they could identify with10 and were allowed to choose any name they liked for their avatar. 
                                                 
8 Elven characters have a slender build with pointed ears and light or dark skin. 
9 Orcish characters have a muscular build with tusks and green or black skin. 
10 The nascent literature concerning avatar identification has not yet determined whether identification effects 
occur primarily as a result of avatars embodying a player’s ideal self, as a result of high similarity between the 
18 
 
Players in the low identification condition were also asked to design an avatar they identified 
with but were required to name the character “Placeholder” and were not allowed to play as 
that avatar. Instead, they were “randomly” assigned to play as an opposite-sex version of the 
default, predesigned avatar of the reptilian race. This avatar was named “Placeholder019” or 
“Placeholder020” depending in its sex. Participants in this condition were led to believe that 
the character they were designing would be saved so that future participants could be 
randomly assigned to play as that character. They also believed that the character they had 
been “randomly” assigned to was designed by another participant. 
 Players in all conditions were asked to explore a cave full of hostile enemies in search 
of treasure. In the unjustified violence condition (designed to promote moral engagement), 
players encountered human enemies and were given the following description: 
“A nearby cave is thought to contain valuable treasure. Unfortunately, there is more 
than treasure in the cave. A group of innocent townspeople have settled in the cave 
after their town was destroyed in the war. They will not take kindly to outsiders 
exploring their home. Your goal is to search the cave and take whatever treasure you 
can find.” 
In order to further humanize the opponents in this condition, each enemy had a unique name 
appropriate to the fantasy setting (e.g., Skulic, Jolf, or Celia). In the justified violence 
condition (designed to promote moral disengagement), players battled against humanoid 
undead creatures and were given the following description: 
                                                                                                                                                       
avatar and the player’s actual self, or as a result of both to varying degrees. Given this uncertainty and the 
fantastical nature of the selected game, I decided to simply ask participants to design an avatar that they could 
identify with so that players felt free to choose fantasy races as well as prototypically human races. In order to 
avoid confounding the uncustomized, low identification condition with actual avatar-player similarity I decided 
to have participants play as an opposite-sex avatar of the reptilian race in the low identification condition 
instead of a prototypically human race. 
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“A nearby cave is thought to contain valuable treasure. Unfortunately, there is more 
than treasure in the cave. A group of unholy undead creatures have recently overrun 
the cave. They will not take kindly to outsiders exploring their home. Your goal is to 
search the cave and take whatever treasure you can find.” 
Enemies in this condition had generic names appropriate to the fantasy setting (e.g., Draugr 
or Restless Draugr). The two conditions were designed to have similar levels of difficulty. 
All players were equipped with a sword and shield and basic armor, but no helmet (so that 
players could see their avatar’s head and face). To ensure that players remained aware of 
their avatar’s appearance, the game was played from the third-person perspective. 
Explicit Guilt 
Immediately after playing the game, participants completed an adapted version of the 
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule – Expanded Form (PANAS-X; Watson & Clark, 
1999). Participants were asked to rate the extent to which they felt 35 different feelings and 
emotions during their gameplay, ranging from “very slightly or not at all (1)” to “extremely 
(5).” The selected items included an eight-item joviality subscale (e.g., “happy” and 
“joyful”), a six-item self-assurance subscale (e.g., “proud” and “bold”), a four-item 
attentiveness subscale (e.g., “alert” and “determined”), a six-item hostility subscale (e.g., 
“angry” and “hostile”), a five-item sadness subscale (e.g., “sad” and “alone”) and a six-item 
guilt subscale (i.e., “guilty,” “ashamed,” “blameworthy,” “angry at self,” “disgusted with 
self,” and “dissatisfied with self”). This final subscale served as the explicit measure of guilt. 
Item order was randomized and all participants completed the items in the same order. 
Subscale scores were calculated by averaging the relevant items. The αs for these subscales 
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were as follows: joviality = .94, self-assurance = .88, attentiveness = .80, hostility = .75, 
sadness = .77, and guilt = .84. 
Video Game Ratings 
After completing the PANAS-X, participants rated their game experience on several 
dimensions using seven-point scales. Three game enjoyment items were adapted from the 
three-item scale used by Lin (2011), with participants rating the extent to which the game 
was “not enjoyable (1) vs. enjoyable (7),” “not likable (1) vs. likable (7),” and “not 
entertaining (1) vs. entertaining (7).” Based upon the Video Game Rating Sheet used by 
Anderson and Dill (2000), participants also rated how difficult, frustrating, and exciting the 
game was; how violent the content and graphics of the game were; and how fast the action 
was. The Video Game Rating Sheet uses seven-point unipolar scales with seven indicating 
presence of the concept (e.g., “very violent content” or “difficult”) and one indicating absence 
of the concept (e.g., “no violent content” or “easy”). Ratings of competitiveness (“not very 
competitive” or “very competitive”) were also obtained. 
Because the four items assessing how enjoyable, likeable, entertaining, and exciting 
the game was were all highly intercorrelated (rs > .72), these items were averaged to create a 
positive video game experience score (α = .95). Ratings of difficulty and frustration were 
also highly related (r = .68), so these two items were averaged to create a negative video 
game experience score (α = .81). Ratings of how violent the content and graphics were 
correlated strongly as well (r = .70) and were averaged to create a video game violence score 
(α = .82). This left five video game rating variables: positive video game experience, 
negative video game experience, violence, action pace, and competitiveness. 
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In-Game Need Satisfaction 
Next, participants completed a modified11 version of the Player Experience of Needs 
Satisfaction (PENS) scale (Ryan, Rigby, & Przybylski, 2006). For the PENS scale, players 
were asked to consider their game experience and to rate their level of agreement (1 = do not 
agree, 7 = strongly agree) with statements designed to assess player experience of 
competence (e.g., how effective and skillful players felt; three items), autonomy (e.g., how 
much freedom the game offered; three items), presence/immersion (e.g., how much the 
player felt like they are actually in the game world; nine items), and intuitive controls (e.g., 
how easy the game controls were; three items). Items were presented in the same random 
order to all participants. Subscale scores were created by averaging the relevant items (after 
reverse coding). The αs were as follows: competence = .85, autonomy = .81, 
presence/immersion = .85, intuitive controls = .80. 
Control Variables and Manipulation Checks 
Following the procedure of Hartmann and Vorderer (2010), participants were also 
asked how familiar they were with Skyrim (1 = not at all, 7 = very much) and the extent to 
which, during their playtime, they thought “this is just a game” and “this is just an 
experiment in which I have to follow instructions” (1 = not at all, 7 = very much). 
Experimental manipulations were tested by asking the extent to which participants agreed (1 
= strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree) with the following statements: “I fought against 
nonhuman creatures rather than against human beings,” “I felt that my in-game actions were 
justified,” and “I could identify with my in-game character” (latter question adapted from 
Fischer et al., 2010). 
 
                                                 
11 The relatedness subscale of the PENS Scale was irrelevant to the current study and was not included. 
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Avatar Identification 
To obtain a more detailed measure of avatar identification, participants completed the 
17-item avatar identification subscale from the player identification scale developed by Van 
Looy et al. (2012). The avatar identification subscale provides a measure of three constructs: 
similarity identification (six items; e.g., “My character is like me in many ways”), wishful 
identification (five items; e.g., “I would like to be more like my character”), and embodied 
presence (six items; e.g., “When playing, it feels as if my character’s body becomes my 
own”). Items were presented in the same random order to all participants. All items were 
rated using a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) so 
that higher scores indicated greater identification. Subscale scores were created by averaging 
the relevant items and a composite score was created by averaging all items. The αs were as 
follows: similarity identification = .90, wishful identification = .87, embodied presence = .91, 
composite avatar identification = .94. 
Cover Story Items 
In keeping with the cover story, participants used a seven-point scale to rate how 
likely (1 = not at all likely, 7 = very likely) they would be to purchase a game similar to the 
one they played for $0, $10, $20, $30, $40, $50, $60, $70, $80, $90, $100, $110 and $120.  
Implicit Guilt 
After the previous scales and the cover story items, implicit guilt was measured using 
an adaptation of the product desirability paradigm used by Gollwitzer and Melzer (2012). 
Participants were presented with pictures and labels of five hygiene products (gender-neutral 
body wash, gender-neutral deodorant/antiperspirant, hand soap, toothbrush, and toothpaste) 
and five non-hygiene products (mechanical pencil pack, gummy bears, milk chocolate bar, 
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post-it note set, and tea sampler). Participants were asked to select the five items that were 
most desirable to them at that moment. The number of hygiene products selected served as 
the measure of implicit guilt (with greater numbers of selected hygiene products indicating a 
desire for moral cleansing, suggesting greater implicit guilt). 
Moral Foundations Sacredness 
Post-play salience of moral foundations was assessed using the 20-item Moral 
Foundations Sacredness Scale (MFSS; Graham & Haidt, 2012). The MFSS assesses how 
willing participants are to violate each of the five moral foundations in exchange for money. 
Participants were asked how much money someone would have to pay them to perform an 
immoral action relevant to each foundation with a response scale of $0 (I’d do it for free), 
$10, $100, $1000, $10000, $100000, a million dollars, and never for any amount of money. 
Examples include: “Kick a dog in the head, hard” (care/harm), “Sign a secret-but-binding 
pledge to only hire people of your race in your company” (fairness/cheating), “Renounce 
your citizenship and become a citizen of another country” (loyalty/betrayal), “Make a 
disrespectful hand gesture to your boss, teacher, or professor” (authority/subversion), and 
“Get a blood transfusion of 1 pint of disease-free, compatible blood from a convicted child 
molester” (sanctity/degradation). Subscale scores were calculated by averaging the relevant 
items. Higher scores indicate greater foundation salience or sacredness. The αs for these 
subscales were as follows: care/harm sacredness = .75, fairness/cheating sacredness = .64, 
authority/subversion sacredness = .75, loyalty/betrayal sacredness = .67, sanctity/degradation 
sacredness = .53. As with the MFQ, although these internal consistencies are somewhat low, 
values in this range are unfortunately common with measures of moral foundations (see, for 
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example: Graham et al., 2011; Graham & Haidt, 2012; Grizzard et al., 2014; Tamborini et al., 
2013). 
Demographics, Video Game Experience, and Suspicion 
Participants were asked to report their sex and age. General video game experience 
was measured using nine items: “Do you ever play video games?” (yes / no), “If so, how 
many hours per week do you play?” (0-5 hours / 6-10 hours / 11-15 hours / 16-20 hours / 
20+ hours), “Please indicate how many years you have been playing video games” (open 
response). Participants also answered six additional questions using the “0-5 hours / 6-10 
hours / 11-15 hours / 16-20 hours / 20+ hours” response scale to assess weekly playtime 
during the summer, during the school year, in recent months, during the 11th and 12th grades, 
during the 9th and 10th grades, and during the 7th and 8th grades. These latter six questions had 
fairly strong intercorrelations (average r = .61, range = .36-.83) and were averaged to create a 
video game experience measure (α = .90). 
Experience with particular genres of video games was also measured. Participants 
were asked to rate how often (1 = never, 4 = sometimes, 7 = all the time) they play 11 
different genres of video games: shooter, action/adventure, puzzle, strategy, simulation, 
music & party, single-player role-playing, sports, massively multiplayer online role-playing, 
real world massive multiplayer, and fighting. Example games for each genre were provided 
with each question. 
During debriefing, experimenters probed participants for suspicion and rated each 
participant on a scale from one (no suspicion whatsoever – completely believed cover story) 
to six (highly suspicious – guessed the true purpose of the study). 
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Procedure 
 Before arrival, participants were randomly assigned to experimental condition. Upon 
arrival, participants signed an informed consent form explaining the experimental procedure 
and stating that the purpose of the experiment was to explore video game characteristics and 
product desirability (see Appendix B). 
 After obtaining informed consent, the experimenter helped the participant start the 
game and create an avatar. Participants watched a short tutorial video to showcase the avatar 
customization options and were then given eight minutes (in private) to design a character 
they could identify with. In the high identification condition, participants were allowed to 
choose a name for their avatar and played the game as that avatar. In the low identification 
condition, participants designed a character they could identify with but were then 
“randomly” reassigned to the default, predesigned opposite-sex avatar of the reptilian race. 
This avatar was named “Placeholder019” or “Placeholder020” depending on sex. 
Next, the experimenter provided the participant with instructions for the game. These 
instructions provided participants with game controls and a full description of their in-game 
task based upon moral disengagement condition (see materials section for full description). 
Participants then played the game for 15 minutes as their avatar. This portion of the 
gameplay was recorded via screen capture software on the computer. During this time, 
participants explored a cave full of hostile enemies in search of treasure. In the unjustified 
violence condition, the cave was filled with uniquely-named human opponents. In the 
justified violence condition, the cave was filled with generically-named humanoid undead 
creatures. Difficulty and environmental setting were the same across conditions. In both 
conditions, player avatars were equipped with a sword and shield to fight enemies. 
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 After 15 minutes of gameplay, participants completed all measures in the form of an 
online questionnaire in the order described in the materials section. Upon questionnaire 
completion, participants were checked for suspicion, debriefed, thanked, and dismissed. 
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CHAPTER 7.   RESULTS 
 
Overview 
 In the following sections I first discuss how the data were prepared for analyses (e.g., 
dealing with missing data and outliers). Next, I test the successfulness of experimental 
manipulations and determine whether the video game conditions were experienced similarly 
for all participants in terms of positive experiences, negative experiences, and ratings of 
violence, action pace, and competitiveness. Then, I test H1-H3 for explicit guilt using logistic 
regressions followed by the first three hypotheses for implicit guilt using ANCOVAs. 
Collectively, these analyses assess whether moral disengagement and avatar identification or 
the salience of the care/harm and fairness/cheating foundations had any influence on player 
experience of guilt (explicit or implicit). Finally, I test H4 using correlations and ANCOVAs 
to determine whether guilt experiences or experimental manipulations had any influence on 
the sacredness of the care/harm and fairness/cheating foundations. 
Data Preparation 
 Missing data were assessed and dealt with at the scale level where possible. There 
were small amounts of missing data at both the item level and the scale level. For individual 
items, data were missing from 2.3% of the sample at most. At the scale level, individual 
participants were missing 11.8% of responses on a given scale at most (i.e., missing 2/17 
items on the avatar identification scale). Because there were so few data missing and the 
missingness appeared to be randomly distributed, all missing values were filled in using each 
participant’s average response to relevant scale or subscale items. For example, for 
participants missing one of the six items on the similarity identification subscale, missing 
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values were filled in with each participant’s average response to the other five items. For 
individual items that were not part of a scale (i.e., ratings of how fast-paced or competitive 
the video game was) missing responses were filled in with the group mean for the 
appropriate experimental condition. 
 Next, univariate and multivariate outliers were assessed using boxplots. All individual 
difference variables that should have been unaffected by experimental manipulations (e.g., 
age, video game genre preferences, video game experience) were assessed without splitting 
by groups. All other variables were split into eight groups based on experimental condition 
(i.e., unjustified violence/justified violence and low avatar identification/high avatar 
identification) and sex (i.e., male/female). Sex was included as an additional grouping 
variable because males and females sometimes differ in their responses to video games. 
Outliers were assessed and dealt with within each of the eight groups separately. When 
extreme outliers were revealed by boxplots, a 90% Winsorization was applied to the variable 
to reduce the influence of the outlier without removing it entirely. To Winsorize, the 5th and 
95th percentiles were calculated for the variable with extreme outliers. Next, all values below 
the 5th percentile were changed to the 5th percentile value and all values above the 95th 
percentile were changed to the 95th percentile value. This procedure successfully reduced the 
outliers to non-extremity for most variables. However, because there was a floor effect for 
the explicit guilt variable (i.e., a severe positive skew) for all eight groups, 90% 
Winsorization was not sufficient to remedy many values being flagged as extreme outliers. 
Because of this, the explicit guilt variable was recoded into a dichotomous variable so that 0 
reflected “felt no guilt” (the lowest possible score of 1.00) and 1 reflected “felt some guilt” (a 
score from 1.01-5.00). After this, there were 223 participants (59.0%) who felt no guilt and 
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155 participants (41.0%) who felt some guilt. There were also a few extremely low outliers 
remaining for the “fought nonhuman creatures” manipulation check variable (for three males 
and two females in the justified violence + high identification condition) and a few extremely 
high outliers remaining for the similarity identification variable (for one female in the 
unjustified violence + low identification condition and one female in the justified violence + 
low identification condition). Given the relative unimportance of these two variables, 
however, these few extreme outliers were left as-is. Multivariate outliers on the primary 
analysis variables within the eight groups were also assessed with Mahalanobis distance, but 
this method revealed no multivariate outliers. 
 Descriptive statistics for all variables of interest are shown in Appendix C and a 
correlation matrix with all primary analysis variables is shown in Appendix D. 
Manipulation Checks 
 A series of 2 (unjustified violence/justified violence) x 2 (low avatar 
identification/high avatar identification) x 2 (male/female) ANOVAs were conducted on the 
manipulation check variables. All statistical assumptions were reasonably met unless 
otherwise noted. Because cell sizes were unequal, adjusted means (i.e., estimated marginal 
means) and standard errors are reported. 
Fought Against Nonhuman Creatures 
A 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA was run with responses to the question: “I fought against 
nonhuman creatures rather than against human beings” as the dependent variable. Model 
residuals revealed four extremely low outliers for males and two extremely low outliers for 
females in the justified violence + high identification condition, suggesting that these 
participants perceived the undead creatures to be human beings. Given the fact that the 
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enemies were designed to be undead versions of humans and the somewhat-confusing 
wording of the question, it is unclear whether these participants should be included or not. 
Because of this, the analysis was run with and without these participants. With all 
participants included, there was a significant main effect of moral disengagement, F(1, 370) 
= 298.23, p < .001, partial η2 = .446. As expected, participants in the justified violence 
condition were significantly more likely than those in the unjustified violence condition to 
report fighting against nonhuman creatures rather than human beings (M = 6.16, SE = .13 vs. 
M = 2.98, SE = .13). Unexpectedly, there was also a marginally significant main effect of 
avatar identification, F(1, 370) = 3.23, p = .073, partial η2 = .009, such that those in the high 
identification condition (compared to those in the low identification condition) were also 
more likely to report having fought against nonhuman creatures rather than human beings (M 
= 4.74, SE = .13 vs. M = 4.41, SE = .13). All other main effects and interactions were non-
significant, Fs < 1.88, p > .171. 
When the six extreme outliers were excluded the significant main effect of moral 
disengagement remained, F(1, 364) = 362.85, p < .001, partial η2 = .499, with participants in 
the justified violence condition once against scoring higher than participants in the 
unjustified violence condition (M = 6.31, SE = .12 vs. M = 2.98, SE = .12). Additionally, the 
main effect of avatar identification became significant, F(1, 364) = 7.43, p = .007, partial η2 
= .020, with high identification participants scoring higher than low identification 
participants (M = 4.88, SE = .12 vs. M = 4.41, SE = .13). All other main effects and 
interactions remained non-significant, Fs < 1.55, ps > .21. Although not expected and 
dependent upon the inclusion or exclusion of outliers, the small difference between the avatar 
identification conditions may reflect a form of psychological distancing. Those who 
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identified more with their avatar may have felt more personally responsible for their avatar 
and have been more motivated to dehumanize their opponents. However, contrary to this 
hypothesis, participant’s responses to the “fought nonhuman creatures” variable did not 
correlate significantly with the composite avatar identification measure (r = -.01, p = .873), 
or with any of the avatar identification subscales (rs ranging from -.04 to .04, ps ranging 
from .448-.777). As such, it is unclear what is causing this small effect. 
Felt That In-Game Actions Were Justified 
A 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA was run with the extent to which participants felt that their in-
game actions were justified as the dependent variable. Model residuals revealed four 
extremely low outliers for males in the justified violence + low identification condition, but 
the statistical conclusions of this analysis did not change when the outliers were excluded. As 
such, the outliers were kept in the analysis. Results revealed a significant main effect of 
moral disengagement, F(1, 370) = 29.34, p < .001, partial η2 = .075, and a significant main 
effect of sex, F(1, 370) = 10.02, p = .002, partial η2 = .026. As expected, participants who 
engaged in justified violence felt more justified than participants who engaged in unjustified 
violence (M = 5.74, SE = .13 vs. M = 4.77, SE = .13). Unexpectedly, males felt more justified 
than females (M = 5.54, SE = .10 vs. M = 4.97, SE = .15). There were no other significant 
main effects or interactions, Fs < .54, ps > .464. 
Identification with Avatar 
A 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA was run with the single item assessing the extent to which 
participants could identify with their in-game character as the dependent variable. Results 
revealed that all three main effects were significant but no interactions were, Fs < .65, ps > 
.422. As expected, participants in the high identification condition identified more than 
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participants in the low identification condition (M = 4.15, SE = .14 vs. M = 2.88, SE = .15), 
F(1, 370) = 40.07, p < .001, partial η2 = .098. Unexpectedly however, participants in the 
justified violence condition also identified with their avatar more than those in the unjustified 
violence condition (M = 3.78, SE = .14 vs. M = 3.25, SE = .14), F(1, 370) = 7.03, p = .008, 
partial η2 = .019. This may have been because participants found it more difficult to identify 
with avatars carrying out unjustified violence. Also unexpected was the finding that males 
identified with their avatars more than females (M = 3.88, SE = .11 vs. M = 3.15, SE = .17), 
F(1, 370) = 12.98, p < .001, partial η2 = .034. This may be attributable to males generally 
having greater experience with video games than females, meaning they have spent more 
time connecting with virtual characters. 
To assess the effectiveness of the avatar identification more thoroughly using a 
multiple-item measure, a final 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA was run with the measure of composite 
avatar identification as the dependent variable. This analysis revealed significant main effects 
of avatar identification, F(1, 370) = 7.028, p < .001, partial η2 = .047, and sex, F(1, 370) = 
7.03, p = .008, partial η2 = .019. Participants in the high identification condition had greater 
identification than those in the low identification condition (M = 2.17, SE = .06 vs. M = 1.80, 
SE = .06) and males identified more than females (M = 2.10, SE = .05 vs. M = 1.87, SE = 
.07). There were no other significant main effects or interactions, Fs < .36, ps > .549. 
Overall, it appears that the moral disengagement (unjustified violence/justified 
violence) manipulation successfully influenced perceptions of the humanity of opponents and 
the extent to which participants felt that their in-game actions were justified. The avatar 
identification manipulation (low identification/high identification) successfully influenced 
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participant’s level of identification with their avatar. It also appears that sex is an important 
factor to consider in the present analyses. 
Game Experience Equivalency 
 Next, to determine whether participants experienced the game similarly across the 
four conditions, a series of 2 (unjustified violence/justified violence) x 2 (low 
identification/high identification) x 2 (male/female) ANCOVAs were conducted with Skyrim 
familiarity as a covariate and measures of video game experience as dependent variables. For 
the positive video game experience variable there was a significant three-way interaction, 
F(1, 369) = 4.36, p = .038, partial η2 = .012. To decompose this effect, simple two-way 
interactions were examined for each sex separately. This revealed a non-significant two-way 
interaction for males, F(1, 369) = 2.29, p = .131, partial η2 = .006, and a non-significant two-
way interaction for females, F(1, 369) = 2.16, p = .142, partial η2 = .006. The only other 
significant effect in the model was for Skyrim familiarity, F(1, 369) = 168.35, p < .001, 
which was strongly, positively correlated with having had a positive video game experience, 
r = .63, p < .001. All other main effects and interactions were non-significant, Fs < 1.50, ps > 
.222. The adjusted means for males were as follows: unjustified violence + low identification 
M = 4.88, SE = .17; unjustified violence + high identification M = 5.21, SE = .16; justified 
violence + low identification M = 4.94, SE = .16; justified violence + high identification M = 
4.80, SE = .16. For females, the adjusted means were: unjustified violence + low 
identification M = 5.01, SE = .26; unjustified violence + high identification M = 4.55, SE = 
.24; justified violence + low identification M = 4.57, SE = .27; justified violence + high 
identification M = 4.87, SE = .24. These values are plotted in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1.   Depiction of the three-way moral disengagement x avatar identification x sex 
interaction for positive video game experience. ID = Identification. 
 For the negative video game experience variable, once again, there was a significant 
three-way interaction, F(1, 369) = 7.71, p = .003, partial η2 = .020.12 This effect was 
decomposed by examining simple two-way interactions for males and females. After 
Bonferroni correction (making the new threshold p < .025), the interaction for males was not 
significant, F(1, 369) = .26, p = .613, partial η2 = .001 but the interaction for females was 
significant, F(1, 369) = 8.67, p = .003, partial η2 = .023. The plot for these interactions is 
shown below in Figure 2. Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc comparisons of the cell means for 
females revealed that the difference between the justified violence + high identification 
condition and the justified violence + low identification condition was significant, mean 
difference = 1.28, SE = .41, 95% CI: [.17, 2.39], p = .015. No other contrasts were 
significant, ps > .318. For females, the adjusted means for the four conditions were as 
follows: justified violence + low identification M = 4.80, SE = .31; justified violence + high 
                                                 
12 There was one extremely high outlier in the residuals but the results did not differ based upon the inclusion or 
exclusion of this participant. Because of this, results are reported with the outlier included. 
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identification M = 3.53, SE = .28; unjustified violence + low identification M = 3.97, SE = 
.30; unjustified violence + high identification M = 4.16, SE = .28. Thus, it seems that for 
female players, engaging in justified violence as an opposite-sex reptilian avatar was 
experienced much more negatively than doing the same as a self-designed avatar. Skyrim 
familiarity was once again a significant covariate, F(1, 369) = 74.74, p < .001, partial η2 = 
.168, with greater familiarity associated with less negative experiences, r = -.54, p < .001. 
 
 
Figure 2.   Depiction of the three-way moral disengagement x avatar identification x sex 
interaction for negative video game experience. ID = Identification. 
 
 For ratings of video game violence, there was a significant main effect of moral 
disengagement, F(1, 369) = 12.61, p < .001, partial η2 = .033. Adjusted means revealed that 
those who carried out unjustified violence considered the game to be more violent (M = 4.70, 
SE = .10) than those who carried out justified violence (M = 4.20, SE = .10). There were no 
other significant main effects or interactions, Fs < 2.19, ps > .139. This suggests that the 
perceptions of video game violence may be partially influenced by the extent to which that 
violence is justified. Counter to this hypothesis, however, ratings of violence did not correlate 
significantly with the extent to which participants felt that their in-game actions were 
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justified. This was true across conditions (r = -.06, p = .248) and within the unjustified 
violence (r = .04, p = .589) and justified violence (r = -.03, p = .672) conditions. Another 
possible explanation is the difference in blood visibility between the two conditions. 
Although both the human and undead opponents bled when attacked, it was generally easier 
to see the blood from the human opponents than from the undead opponents. 
 For ratings of how fast-paced the action was, there was a significant avatar 
identification by sex interaction, F(1, 369) = 3.93, p = .048, partial η2 = .011, and Skyrim 
familiarity served as a significant covariate, F(1, 369) = 23.43, p < .001, partial η2 = .060, 
with greater familiarity associated with rating the game as more fast-paced, r = .27, p < .001. 
The two-way interaction is plotted in Figure 3. Adjusted means were as follows: male + low 
identification M = 3.53, SE = .12; male + high identification M = 3.74, SE = .12; female + 
low identification M = 3.87, SE = .20; female + high identification M = 3.48, SE = .18. All 
other main effects and interactions were non-significant, Fs < 3.45, ps > .063. 
 
Figure 3.   Depiction of two-way avatar identification x sex interaction for video game 
action pace. ID = identification. Higher action pace ratings indicate a faster pace. 
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 For ratings of competitiveness, the overall model was not significant and was not 
examined further, F(8, 369) = 1.20, p = .298, partial η2 = .025. This suggests that ratings of 
competitiveness were similar for both sexes and across the four experimental conditions 
regardless of familiarity with Skyrim. 
 Overall, although significant interactions did emerge, the differences between groups 
were fairly small (with the exception of the negative video game experience variable). Thus, 
it seems that the conditions were experienced fairly similarly by all participants in terms of 
positive experiences and perceptions of violence, action pace, and competitiveness. 
Hypothesis Testing 
Effects of Experimental Manipulations on Explicit Guilt 
It was predicted that players who engaged in unjustified violence would feel guiltier 
than those who engaged in justified violence (a main effect; H1) and that moral 
disengagement and avatar identification would interact so that guilt would be highest for 
players who engaged in unjustified violence and were highly identified with their avatar 
(H2). Although these hypotheses were intended to be tested using a 2 (unjustified 
violence/justified violence) x 2 (low identification/high identification) ANCOVA, the floor 
effect that occurred for the explicit guilt variable made it impossible to meet the necessary 
statistical assumptions (there were far too many values flagged as extremely high outliers). 
Because of this, the explicit guilt variable was dichotomized so that zero reflected “felt no 
guilt” (the lowest possible score, 1.00) and one reflected “felt some guilt” (a score between 
1.01 and 5.00). After this, binary logistic regression was used instead of ANCOVA. 
 To determine which covariates to include in the analysis, correlations were calculated 
between explicit guilt (both the dichotomized and continuous versions) and potential 
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covariates (demographic variables and theoretically-justified variables). These correlations 
are shown in Table 1. Variables were considered good covariates if they were significantly 
related to explicit guilt but not significantly related to experimental manipulations. As shown 
in Table 1, sex, Skyrim familiarity, the “just a game” variable, and overall video game 
experience all emerged as good covariates. To identify potential issues with multicollinearity, 
correlations among these variables were examined. Skyrim familiarity and video game 
experience were strongly correlated (r = .56, p < .001). Because Skyrim familiarity had a 
stronger association with guilt, this variable was selected as a covariate over video game 
experience. 
Table 1. 
Correlations between Potential Covariates, Explicit Guilt, Implicit Guilt and Dummy-
Coded Factors 
 Explicit Guilt 
(Dichotomized) 
Explicit 
Guilt 
Implicit 
Guilt 
Moral 
Disengagement 
Avatar 
Identification 
Sex .12* .20** -.19*** -.02 .02 
Age .04 .05 .05 .06 .03 
Skyrim Familiarity -.36*** -.34*** -.01 -.06 -.01 
Thought “This is 
Just a Game” 
.10† .13* .05 .06 -.01 
Thought “This is 
Just an Experiment” 
.05 .06 .02 .03 -.00 
Video Game 
Experience 
-.23*** -.27*** .05 -.07 -.03 
Note.  N = 378. Explicit Guilt (Dichotomized) coded as 0 = felt no guilt, 1 = felt some guilt. 
Moral Disengagement coded as 0 = unjustified violence, 1 = justified violence; Avatar 
Identification coded as 0 = low identification, 1 = high identification; Sex coded as 1 = male, 
2 = female. 
† p = .05, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
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 A binary logistic regression was run with moral disengagement, avatar identification, 
and the moral disengagement by avatar identification interaction included as predictors along 
with sex, Skyrim familiarity, and the “just a game” variable. There was one outlier with a 
standardized residual greater than 3.00 which was excluded from the analysis. All other 
statistical assumptions were met. The model was statistically significant, 2(6) = 63.53, p < 
.001, explaining 20.9% of the variance in guilt according the Nagelkerke Pseudo-R2, and 
correctly classifying 68.4% of cases. The sensitivity was 61.0% and the specificity was 
73.5%. That is, of participants who felt some guilt, 61.0% were classified successfully by the 
model and of participants who felt no guilt, 73.5% were classified correctly by the model. 
The results for individual predictors are shown in Table 2 and the model-predicted and actual 
percentages of participants who felt guilt in each condition are shown in Table 3. Contrary to 
H1, there was no significant main effect of moral disengagement (p = .171). There was also 
no significant moral disengagement by avatar identification interaction (p = .068), although 
this effect approached traditional significance levels. Sex and the extent to which participants 
thought “this is just a game” to themselves while playing were also non-significant predictors 
(ps = .146 and .292, respectively). Skyrim familiarity, however, did have a significant effect, 
with each one unit increase in familiarity associated with a 31% reduction in the odds of 
feeling any guilt. 
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Table 2. 
Binary Logistic Regression Predicting Likelihood of Feeling Guilt based on Moral 
Disengagement, Avatar Identification, Moral Disengagement x Avatar Identification, 
Sex, Skyrim Familiarity, and the Extent to Which Participants Thought “This is Just a 
Game” While Playing. 
 
B SE Wald df p Odds Ratio 
95% CI for 
Odds Ratio 
Moral Disengagement .45 .33 1.875 1 .171 1.57 [.82, 3.00] 
Avatar Identification .05 .33 .024 1 .876 1.05 [.55, 2.01] 
Moral Disengagement x 
Avatar Identification 
-.84 .46 3.329 1 .068 .43 [.18, 1.06] 
Sex -.40 .28 2.117 1 .146 .67 [.39, 1.15] 
Skyrim Familiarity -.37 .06 43.679 1 .000 .69 [.62, .77] 
Thought “This is Just a Game” .06 .06 1.112 1 .292 1.06 [.62, .77] 
Constant .69 .42 2.678 1 .102 1.99  
Note.  N = 377. Explicit Guilt (Dichotomized) coded as 0 = felt no guilt, 1 = felt some guilt. 
Moral Disengagement coded as 0 = morally engaged, 1 = morally disengaged; Avatar 
Identification coded as 0 = low identification, 1 = high identification; Sex coded as 0 = male, 
1 = female. 
 
Table 3. 
Model-Predicted and Actual Percentages of Participants Feeling Guilt in Each 
Condition from the Model Shown in Table 2. 
 Predicted Percentage [Compared to Actual Percentage] of 
Participants Feeling Guilt in Each Condition 
 Low Identification High Identification 
Unjustified Violence 45.3% [39.5%] 44.9% [38.8%] 
Justified Violence 56.8% [49.5%] 16.3% [35.7%] 
 
 Although the expected interaction did not reach conventional levels of statistical 
significance, it did approach the threshold. Because of this, an exploratory analysis was 
conducted to examine the interaction in further detail. Specifically, two separate logistic 
regressions were carried out on participants in the unjustified violence and justified violence 
conditions. Both logistic regressions included likelihood of feeling guilt as the outcome 
variable and avatar identification, sex, Skyrim familiarity, and the “just a game” variable as 
predictors. The results for the predictors of both models are shown in Table 4 and the model-
predicted and actual percentages of participants feeling guilt in each condition are shown in 
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Table 5. For participants who engaged in unjustified violence the model was statistically 
significant, 2(4) = 32.04, p < .001, explaining 21.7% of the variance in guilt according to the 
Nagelkerke Pseudo-R2, and correctly classifying 67.9% of cases. The sensitivity (i.e., the 
percentage of correct classification of players who felt some guilt) was 52.8%. The 
specificity (i.e., the percentage of correct classifications of players who felt no guilt) was 
77.7%. For these players, avatar identification and sex did not significantly predict the 
likelihood of feeling guilt (ps = .875 and .978, respectively). There were, however, 
significant effects of Skyrim familiarity (p < .001) and the “just a game” variable (p = .031). 
Similar to before, each one unit increase in Skyrim familiarity was associated with a 27% 
reduction in the odds of feeling guilt. Each one unit increase on the “just a game” variable 
was associated with a 19% increase in the odds of feeling guilt—that is the more participants 
thought “this is just a game” to themselves while playing, the more likely they were to feel 
guilt. This counterintuitive finding may attributable to emotional regulation. Participants who 
were morally engaged may have attempted to decrease feelings of guilt by reminding 
themselves that what they are doing is “just a game,” and thus, they should not feel bad about 
it. 
Table 4. 
Separate Binary Logistic Regressions for Unjustified and Justified Violence Conditions 
Predicting Likelihood of Feeling Guilt based on Avatar Identification, Sex, Skyrim 
Familiarity, and the Extent to Which Participants Thought “This is Just a Game” 
While Playing. 
 
B SE Wald df p Odds Ratio 
95% CI for 
Odds Ratio 
Unjustified Violence        
Avatar Identification .05 .33 .025 1 .875 1.05 [.55, 2.02] 
Sex -.01 .39 .001 1 .978 .99 [.46, 2.13] 
Skyrim Familiarity -.32 .08 17.243 1 .000 .73 [.62, .84] 
Thought “This is Just a Game” .18 .08 4.630 1 .031 1.19 [1.02, 1.40] 
Constant -.07 .54 .019 1 .892 .93  
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Table 4 continued 
Justified Violence        
Avatar Identification -.81 .33 6.126 1 .013 .44 [.23, .85] 
Sex -.81 .40 4.207 1 .040 .44 [.20, .97] 
Skyrim Familiarity -.42 .08 27.156 1 .000 .66 [.56, .77] 
Thought “This is Just a Game” -.06 .08 .516 1 .473 .94 [.80, 1.11] 
Constant 1.95 .58 11.324 1 .007 7.01  
Note.  N = 184 for Unjustified Violence, N = 193 for Justified Violence. Explicit Guilt 
(Dichotomized) coded as 0 = felt no guilt, 1 = felt some guilt; Avatar Identification coded as 
0 = low identification, 1 = high identification; Sex coded as 0 = male, 1 = female. 
 
Table 5. 
Model-Predicted and Actual Percentages of Participants Feeling Guilt in Each 
Condition from the Separate Models Shown in Table 4. 
 Predicted Percentage [Compared to Actual Percentage] of 
Participants Feeling Guilt in Each Condition 
 Low Identification High Identification 
Unjustified Violence 36.0% [39.5%] 32.7% [38.8%] 
Justified Violence 56.8% [49.5%] 26.5% [35.7%] 
 
 For participants who engaged in justified violence the model was statistically 
significant, 2(4) = 36.97, p < .001, explaining 23.4% of the variance in guilt according the 
Nagelkerke Pseudo-R2, and correctly classifying 73.1% of cases. The sensitivity (i.e., the 
percentage of correct classification of players who experience some guilt) was 67.1%, and 
the specificity (i.e., the percentage of correct classifications of players who felt no guilt) was 
77.5%. For these participants the “just a game” variable was not a significant predictor, but 
all other variables were (ps < .041). Being in the high identification condition was associated 
with a 66% reduction in the odds of feeling guilt compared to the low avatar identification 
condition. Thus, participants who fought against unholy, undead creatures with an avatar of 
their own design were especially likely to feel no guilt compared to those who did the same 
as an opposite-sex reptilian avatar. Sex was also a significant predictor with being female 
associated with a 66% reduction in the odds of feeling guilt as compared to being male. 
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Finally, Skyrim familiarity was once again a significant predictor, with each one unit 
increase in familiarity associated with a 34% reduction in the odds of feeling guilt. 
To summarize, this set of analyses provided no support for H1, as there was no 
significant effect of the moral disengagement condition alone. There was partial support for 
H2 in that there was a marginally significant interaction between moral disengagement and 
avatar identification, but this interaction was not in the expected direction. Instead of high 
avatar identification making players feel especially guilty when carrying out unjustified 
violence, avatar identification had no significant effect for these participants. Instead, high 
avatar identification seemed to make guilt especially unlikely for participants who were 
carrying out justified violence. However, given the exploratory nature of decomposing a 
marginally significant interaction, these results should be interpreted with caution. 
Effects of Moral Disengagement and Similarity Identification on Explicit Guilt 
To complement the previous analyses, an additional logistic regression was run 
substituting the experimental avatar identification factor (low identification/high 
identification) with a continuous measure of avatar identification. Although the avatar 
identification manipulation did produce significant differences in the composite measure of 
avatar identification, the differences were fairly small. Because three avatar identification 
subscales were available (i.e., similarity identification, wishful identification, and embodied 
presence), independent t-tests were conducted to test how each of the subscales was impacted 
by the avatar identification manipulation. All three t-tests were significant. Participants in the 
high identification condition had significantly higher levels of similarity identification (M = 
2.15, SD = .90) than did those in the low identification condition (M = 1.64, SD = .73), 
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t(368.97813) = 6.09, p < .001, d = .63. Participants in the high identification condition also 
had significantly higher levels of wishful identification (M = 1.98, SD = .87) than did those in 
the low identification condition (M = 1.71, SD = .82), t(375) = 3.09, p = .002, d = .32. 
Finally, those in the high identification condition also had significantly higher levels of 
embodied presence (M = 2.45, SD = 1.01) than did those in the low identification condition 
(M = 2.21, SD = .97), t(375) = 2.36, p = .019, d = .24. Thus, participants who played as an 
avatar that they designed (as compared to an opposite-sex, reptilian avatar), felt more similar 
to that avatar, wished they were more like that avatar, and felt more like they were present in 
the body of that avatar as they played. The effect of the manipulation was largest for 
similarity identification, followed by wishful identification, and then embodied presence. 
Because the avatar identification manipulation had the largest effect on similarity 
identification, this continuous measure (centered at the mean) was used in place of the 
experimental avatar identification factor in another logistic regression. Likelihood of feeling 
guilt was predicted by moral disengagement (unjustified violence/justified violence), 
similarity identification, moral disengagement by similarity identification, sex, Skyrim 
familiarity, and the extent to which participants thought “this is just a game” to themselves 
while playing. One extreme outlier with a standardized residual of 3.03 was excluded from 
the analysis. After this, no standardized residuals greater than |2.50| remained. The resulting 
model was significant, 2(6) = 62.51, p < .001, explaining 20.6% of the variance in guilt 
according the Nagelkerke Pseudo-R2, and correctly classifying 68.2% of cases. The 
sensitivity and specificity values showed that 64.3% of the participants that felt guilt were 
correctly classified and 70.9% of the participants that felt no guilt were correctly classified. 
                                                 
13 The assumption of homogeneity of variance was violated so the t-test correcting for this was used. 
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The results for individual predictors are shown in Table 6. The main effect of moral 
disengagement was non-significant (p = .998). There was a marginally significant effect of 
similarity identification (p = .063), but this was qualified by a significant moral 
disengagement by similarity identification interaction (p = .026). Sex and the “just a game” 
variable were not significant predictors (ps = .133 and .321, respectively), but Skyrim 
familiarity was (p < .001). Every one unit increase in Skyrim familiarity was associated with 
a 30% reduction in the odds of experiencing guilt. 
Table 6. 
Binary Logistic Regression Predicting Likelihood of Feeling Guilt based on Moral 
Disengagement, Similarity Identification, Moral Disengagement x Similarity 
Identification, Sex, Skyrim Familiarity, and the Extent to Which Participants Thought 
“This is Just a Game” While Playing. 
 
B SE Wald df p Odds Ratio 
95% CI for 
Odds Ratio 
Moral Disengagement -.00 .23 .000 1 .998 1.00 [.64, 1.57] 
Similarity Identification .37 .20 3.458 1 .063 1.45 [.98, 2.15] 
Moral Disengagement x 
Similarity Identification 
-.60 .27 4.989 1 .026 .55 [.32, .93] 
Sex -.41 .28 2.252 1 .133 .66 [.39, 1.14] 
Skyrim Familiarity -.36 .06 41.132 1 .000 .70 [.63, .78] 
Thought “This is Just a Game” .06 .06 .985 1 .321 1.06 [.95, 1.18] 
Constant .73 .39 3.533 1 .060 2.07  
Note.  N = 377. Explicit Guilt (Dichotomized) coded as 0 = felt no guilt, 1 = felt some guilt. 
Moral Disengagement coded as 0 = unjustified violence, 1 = justified violence; Sex coded as 
0 = male, 1 = female. Similarity Identification was centered at the mean. 
 
 To make sense of the significant interaction term, logistic regressions were run 
separately on participants in the unjustified violence condition (N = 184) and participants in 
the justified violence condition (N = 193). For participants engaging in unjustified violence, 
the model was significant, 2(4) = 35.62, p < .001, explaining 23.9% of the variance in guilt 
according the Nagelkerke Pseudo-R2, and correctly classifying 66.3% of cases. The 
sensitivity and specificity values showed that 51.4% of the participants that felt guilt were 
correctly classified and 75.9% of the participants that felt no guilt were correctly classified. 
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Results for individual predictors are shown in Table 7. The effect of similarity identification 
was marginally significant (p = .061),14 with each one unit increase in similarity 
identification associated with a 48% increase in the likelihood of feeling guilt. This provides 
support for the hypothesized interaction (H2)—participants who engaged in unjustified 
violence were most likely to feel guilty when they identified highly with their avatar (through 
perceived similarity). The effect of sex was non-significant (p = .890), but Skyrim familiarity 
and the “just a game” variable both emerged as significant predictors (ps < .001 and = .030, 
respectively). Each one unit increase in Skyrim familiarity was associated with a 29% 
decrease in the odds of feeling guilt. Each one unit increase in the extent to which 
participants thought “this is just a game” while playing was associated with a 20% increase 
in the likelihood of feeling guilt. 
Table 7. 
Separate Binary Logistic Regression for Participants in the Unjustified and Justified 
Violence Conditions Predicting Likelihood of Feeling Guilt based on Similarity 
Identification, Sex, Skyrim Familiarity, and the Extent to Which Participants Thought 
“This is Just a Game” While Playing. 
 
B SE Wald df p Odds Ratio 
95% CI for 
Odds Ratio 
Unjustified Violence        
Similarity Identification .39 .21 3.507 1 .061 1.48 [.98, 2.22] 
Sex -.06 .40 .019 1 .890 .95 [.44, 2.05] 
Skyrim Familiarity -.35 .08 19.053 1 .000 .71 [.60, .83] 
Thought “This is Just a Game” -.18 .08 4.734 1 .030 1.20 [1.02, 1.41] 
Constant .06 .52 .013 1 .909 1.06  
                                                 
14 It is important to keep in mind that the sample size has essentially been halved for this test, reducing the 
power to detect effects in each of the moral disengagement conditions. Thus, I believe it is justified to treat this 
effect as practically significant (especially given the significant interaction term). 
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Table 7 continued 
Justified Violence        
Similarity Identification -.27 .19 2.086 1 .149 .76 [.53, 1.10] 
Sex -.79 .39 4.043 1 .044 .46 [.21, .98] 
Skyrim Familiarity -.38 .08 22.421 1 .000 .69 [.59, .80] 
Thought “This is Just a Game” -.07 .08 .682 1 .409 .94 [.80, 1.10] 
Constant 1.42 .53 7.222 1 .007 4.14  
Note.  N = 184 for Unjustified Violence and N = 193 for Justified Violence. Explicit Guilt 
(Dichotomized) coded as 0 = felt no guilt, 1 = felt some guilt; Sex coded as 0 = male, 1 = 
female. Similarity Identification was centered at the mean. 
 
 For participants who engaged in justified violence, the model was significant, 2(4) = 
32.77, p < .001, explaining 21.0% of the variance in guilt according the Nagelkerke Pseudo-
R2, and correctly classifying 69.9% of cases. The sensitivity and specificity values showed 
that 67.1% of the participants that felt guilt were correctly classified and 72.1% of the 
participants that felt no guilt were correctly classified. In this model similarity identification 
was not a significant predictor (p = .149), nor was the “just a game” variable (p = .409). Sex 
and Skyrim familiarity were significant predictors, however (ps = .044 and < .001, 
respectively). Being female (as compared to male) was associated with a 54% decrease in the 
odds of feeling guilt and each one unit increase in Skyrim familiarity was associated with a 
31% decrease in the odds of feeling guilt. The effects of similarity identification on the 
probability of feeling guilt in the two moral disengagement conditions (controlling for other 
variables) are shown in Figure 4. Interestingly, although the effect of similarity identification 
was not significant for participants in the justified violence condition, the effect approached 
significance and was in the same direction as the significant effect of the avatar identification 
factor (i.e., low/high) from the prior analysis. 
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Figure 4.   Predicted probability of feeling guilt at different levels of similarity 
identification for the justified and unjustified violence conditions controlling for sex, 
Skyrim familiarity, and the extent to which participants thought “this is just a game” to 
themselves while playing. 
 
Effects of Moral Foundation Salience on Explicit Guilt 
It was also predicted that the experimental manipulations would only affect guilt if 
players endorsed the care/harm and fairness/cheating foundations (H3). This hypothesis 
would be supported if (1) the salience of these two foundations served as significant 
predictors when added to the initial model, with higher levels of endorsement increasing the 
likelihood of experiencing guilt, or (2) foundation salience interacted with experimental 
conditions, with low salience levels making guilt unlikely regardless of experimental 
conditions. This hypothesis was tested by re-running the initial logistic regression with 
care/harm and fairness/cheating foundation salience as additional predictors using only the 
subsample of 96 participants who completed the measure of moral foundation salience 
outside of the lab (i.e., the MFQ). The effects of care/harm and fairness/cheating foundation 
salience were examined separately. 
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To test for effects of care/harm salience, the initial logistic regression was re-run with 
care/harm salience as a predictor along with the two-way interactions between care/harm 
salience and the experimental factors (i.e., moral disengagement and avatar identification). 15 
Care/harm salience was centered at the mean. There was one extreme outlier with a 
standardized residual of 4.39 in the first run and an additional extreme outlier with a 
standardized residual of 3.58 in the second run. After excluding these two participants there 
were no standardized residuals greater than |3|. Results revealed that the model was 
statistically significant, 2(9) = 40.82, p < .001, explaining 47.4% of the variance in guilt 
according the Nagelkerke Pseudo-R2, and correctly classifying 75.5% of cases. Examination 
of sensitivity and specificity revealed that 71.8% of players who experienced some guilt were 
correctly classified and 78.2% of players who experienced no guilt were correctly classified. 
The results for individual predictors are shown in Table 8 and the model-predicted and actual 
percentages of participants feeling guilt in each condition are shown in Table 9. The effects 
of moral disengagement, avatar identification, and the moral disengagement by avatar 
identification interaction were all non-significant (ps > .317). Care/harm salience was a 
marginally significant predictor (p = .096) and there was a marginally significant interaction 
between care/harm salience and moral disengagement (p = .086), but no significant 
interaction between care/harm salience and avatar identification (p = .688). Sex and Skyrim 
familiarity were also significant predictors (ps = .034 and .002, respectively) with being 
female as compared to male increasing the odds of experiencing guilt by 335% and each one-
unit increase in Skyrim familiarity decreasing the odds of experiencing guilt by 35%. The 
                                                 
15 Originally, the three-way interaction was included as well but this was not significant in any model and 
seemed to cause issues with the odds ratios that were produced (e.g., in some analyses, there were odds ratios as 
large as 6,758,029 in the upper limit of the 95% CI). It seems likely that the model was simply too complicated 
for such a small sample (96 participants). The same problem occurred when using the fairness/cheating 
foundation in subsequent analyses and the same strategy was used. 
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“just a game” variable was also marginally significant (p = .088), with each one unit increase 
associated with a 22% decrease in the odds of experiencing guilt. Due to the significantly 
reduced sample size for this analysis, the marginally significant interaction was not explored 
further. 
Table 8. 
Binary Logistic Regression Predicting Likelihood of Feeling Guilt based on Moral 
Disengagement, Avatar Identification, Care/Harm Foundation Salience, Interactions 
between Those Variables, Sex, Skyrim Familiarity, and the Extent to Which 
Participants Thought “This is Just a Game” While Playing. 
 
B SE Wald df p Odds Ratio 
95% CI for 
Odds Ratio 
Moral Disengagement .42 .90 .218 1 .640 1.52 [.26, 8.89] 
Avatar Identification -.89 .89 .997 1 .318 .41 [.07, 2.36] 
Care/Harm Salience -1.43 .86 2.770 1 .096 .24 [.05, 1.29] 
Moral Disengagement x 
Avatar Identification 
.46 1.14 .161 1 .688 1.58 [.17, 14.91] 
Care/Harm Salience x 
Moral Disengagement 
1.51 .88 2.945 1 .086 4.52 [.81, 25.28] 
Care/Harm Salience x 
Avatar Identification 
-.45 .84 .288 1 .592 .64 [.12, 3.31] 
Sex 1.47 .69 4.492 1 .034 4.35 [1.12, 16.91] 
Skyrim Familiarity -.43 .14 9.213 1 .002 .65 [.50, .86] 
Thought “This is Just a Game” -.25 .14 2.905 1 .088 .78 [.59, 1.04] 
Constant 1.44 1.18 1.486 1 .223 4.24  
Note.  N = 94. Explicit Guilt (Dichotomized) coded as 0 = felt no guilt, 1 = felt some guilt. 
Moral Disengagement coded as 0 = unjustified violence, 1 = justified violence; Avatar 
Identification coded as 0 = low identification, 1 = high identification; Sex coded as 0 = male, 
1 = female. Care/Harm Salience was centered at the mean. 
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Table 9. 
Model-Predicted and Actual Percentages of Participants Feeling Guilt in Each 
Condition from the Model Shown in Table 8. 
 Predicted Percentage [Compared to Actual Percentage] of 
Participants Feeling Guilt in Each Condition 
 Low Identification High Identification 
Unjustified Violence 37.5% [37.5%] 42.9% [35.7%] 
Justified Violence 54.5% [50.0%] 35.7% [42.9%] 
 
 
Next, the effects of fairness/cheating foundation salience on the likelihood of feeling 
guilt were examined using the same strategy as before. Moral disengagement, avatar 
identification, fairness/cheating salience, and all two-way interactions between these 
variables were entered as predictors along with sex, Skyrim familiarity, and the “just a game” 
variable. The resulting model was statistically significant, 2(9) = 30.65, p < .001, explaining 
36.7% of the variance in guilt according the Nagelkerke Pseudo-R2, and correctly classifying 
75.0% of cases with a sensitivity of 70.7% and a specificity of 78.2%. Results for individual 
predictors are shown in Table 10 and the model-predicted and actual percentages of 
participants feeling guilt are shown in Table 11. Fairness/cheating salience did not emerge as 
a significant predictor alone or in interaction with moral disengagement or avatar 
identification (ps > .217). The only significant predictor was Skyrim familiarity once again (p 
= .003), with every one unit increase in familiarity associated with a 30% reduction in the 
odds of feeling guilt. Sex also emerged as a marginally significant predictor (p = .075), with 
being female (as compared to male) associated with a 186% increase in the odds of feeling 
guilt. 
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Table 10. 
Binary Logistic Regression Predicting Likelihood of Feeling Guilt based on Moral 
Disengagement, Avatar Identification, Fairness/Cheating Foundation Salience, 
Interactions between Those Variables, Sex, Skyrim Familiarity, and the Extent to 
Which Participants Thought “This is Just a Game” While Playing. 
 
B SE Wald df p Odds Ratio 
95% CI for 
Odds Ratio 
Moral Disengagement .39 .83 .225 1 .635 1.48 [.29, 7.53] 
Avatar Identification -.25 .82 .094 1 .759 .78 [.16, 3.85] 
Fairness/Cheating Salience -.98 1.00 .009 1 .325 .37 [.05, 2.65] 
Moral Disengagement x 
Avatar Identification 
-.10 1.06 .009 1 .925 .91 [.11, 7.20] 
Fairness/Cheating x 
Moral Disengagement 
1.14 .93 1.520 1 .218 3.13 [.51, 19.24] 
Fairness/Cheating x 
Avatar Identification 
-.41 .99 .174 1 .677 .66 [.10, 4.60] 
Sex 1.05 .59 3.165 1 .075 2.86 [.90, 9.08] 
Skyrim Familiarity -.37 .12 9.134 1 .003 .70 [.55, .88] 
Thought “This is Just a Game” -.12 .13 .841 1 .359 .89 [.69, 1.15] 
Constant .88 1.08 .67 1 .414 2.41  
Note.  N = 96. Explicit Guilt (Dichotomized) coded as 0 = felt no guilt, 1 = felt some guilt. 
Moral Disengagement coded as 0 = unjustified violence, 1 = justified violence; Avatar 
Identification coded as 0 = low identification, 1 = high identification; Sex coded as 0 = male, 
1 = female. Fairness/Cheating Salience was centered at the mean. 
 
Table 11. 
Model-Predicted and Actual Percentages of Participants Feeling Guilt in Each 
Condition from the Models Shown in Table 10. 
 Predicted Percentage [Compared to Actual Percentage] of 
Participants Feeling Guilt in Each Condition 
 Low Identification High Identification 
Unjustified Violence 31.3% [37.5%] 40.0% [40.0%] 
Justified Violence 59.1% [50.0%] 39.3% [42.9%] 
 
Overall, the predicted effects of care/harm and fairness/cheating foundation salience 
were not supported. There was no evidence for any effect of fairness/cheating foundation 
salience and the effects of care/ham foundation salience were only marginally significant. 
However, given the small sample size (N = 96) available to test these hypotheses and the 
fairly low reliabilities of the moral foundation salience measures, these findings should not 
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be interpreted as strong evidence against the existence of an effect of moral foundation 
salience on the experience of guilt. 
Effects of Experimental Manipulations on Implicit Guilt 
It was predicted that H1 and H2 would be the same for implicit guilt as explicit guilt. 
Once again, covariates were assessed for inclusion by examining correlations between 
implicit guilt and potential covariates as well as the correlations between potential covariates 
and experimental factors (see Table 1). Sex emerged as the only variable that was 
significantly related to implicit guilt but not significantly related to experimental conditions. 
Based upon this, a 2 (unjustified violence/justified violence) x 2 (low avatar 
identification/high avatar identification) ANCOVA was conducted with sex as a covariate 
and implicit guilt as the dependent variable. Contrary to predictions, there were no significant 
main effects or interactions: moral disengagement, F(1, 373) = 1.91, p = .168, partial η2 = 
.005; avatar identification, F(1, 373) = 1.983, p = .160, partial η2 = .005; moral 
disengagement by avatar identification, F(1, 373) = 2.250, p = .134, partial η2 = .006. 
However, sex was a significant covariate, F(1, 373) = 14.03, p < .001, partial η2 = .036. 
Adjusted means were as follows: unjustified violence + low identification M = 1.84, SE = 
.11; unjustified violence + high identification M = 1.83, SE = .10; justified violence + low 
identification M = 1.83, SE = .11; justified violence + high identification M = 2.14, SE = .10. 
Thus, H1 and H2 were not supported: there was no evidence that the moral disengagement or 
avatar identification manipulations had any effect on implicit guilt. Participants in all 
conditions selected equivalent numbers of hygiene products as most desirable to them at that 
moment. 
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Effects of Moral Foundation Salience on Implicit Guilt 
As with explicit guilt, it was also predicted that the effect of the experimental 
manipulations on implicit guilt would vary based upon the endorsement of the care/harm and 
fairness/cheating foundations (H3). To test this, the ANCOVA model was re-run with the 
addition of care/harm and fairness/cheating foundation salience (in two separate models). For 
care/harm, the ANCOVA model was customized to include moral disengagement, avatar 
identification, and care/harm foundation salience along with all two-way and three-way 
interactions between these variables. Sex was also included in the model. This yielded an 
overall model that was non-significant, F(8, 87) = .76, p = .638, partial η2 = .065, and was 
thus not interpreted. To test whether this may have been a consequence of an 
overcomplicated model, the model was simplified by removing the three-way interaction and 
sex. The resulting model was also non-significant, F(6, 89) = .70, p = .651, partial η2 = .045. 
Thus, there was no evidence for any effect of care/harm foundation salience on implicit guilt. 
The customized ANCOVA model was re-run with fairness/cheating foundation 
salience instead of care/harm foundation salience. This model was also non-significant, F(8, 
87) = 1.03, p = .419, partial η2 = .087. Reducing the complexity of this model by removing 
the three-way interaction and sex also produced a non-significant model, F(6, 89) = .90, p = 
.501, partial η2 = .057. Thus, there was also no evidence for any effect of fairness/cheating 
foundation salience on implicit guilt; H3 was not supported. 
Moral Foundation Sacredness 
Finally, it was predicted that player experience of guilt would lead to short-term 
increases in the salience of violated moral foundations (i.e., the care/harm and 
fairness/cheating foundations; H4). However, given the tenuous effects of experimental 
55 
 
manipulations on explicit and implicit guilt, treating guilt as a mediator between 
experimental condition and the sacredness of relevant moral foundations makes little sense. 
Because of this, the relation between player experience of guilt and moral foundation 
sacredness was tested using correlations. The hypothesis would be supported by positive 
correlations (across conditions or within them) between guilt (explicit or implicit) and the 
sacredness of moral foundations. As shown in Table 12, correlations provided no support for 
this hypothesis. There was one marginally significant correlation (r = -.19, p = .056) between 
dichotomized explicit guilt and fairness/cheating foundation sacredness for participants in the 
unjustified violence + high identification condition, but it was in the opposite direction of 
what was expected. Having felt some guilt was associated with less sacredness (i.e., being 
more willing to violate that moral foundation in exchange for money). However, given that 
the relation was not similar for the continuous variable it seems that little confidence should 
be placed in this finding. Thus, there was no evidence that player experience of guilt had any 
effect on the sacredness of the care/harm and fairness/cheating foundations; H4 was not 
supported. Given the floor effect observed on the guilt variable, however, this should not be 
viewed as strong evidence against the relation between guilt experiences and short-term 
changes in moral foundation salience. 
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Table 12. 
Correlations (Across and Within Conditions) between Explicit Guilt, Implicit Guilt, 
and the Sacredness of the Care/Harm and Fairness/Cheating Foundations 
 Explicit Guilt 
(Dichotomized) 
Explicit Guilt 
(Continuous) 
Implicit Guilt 
Across Conditions    
Care/Harm Sacredness .06 .05 .01 
Fairness/Cheating Sacredness -.04 .00 -.01 
Unjustified Violence + Low ID    
Care/Harm Sacredness .12 .05 .04 
Fairness/Cheating Sacredness -.09 -.16 .08 
Unjustified Violence + High ID    
Care/Harm Sacredness .02 .06 .02 
Fairness/Cheating Sacredness -.19† .07 -.14 
Justified Violence + Low ID    
Care/Harm Sacredness .12 .03 -.01 
Fairness/Cheating Sacredness .09 .10 .04 
Justified Violence + High ID    
Care/Harm Sacredness -.00 .04 -.01 
Fairness/Cheating Sacredness .07 .12 .01 
Note.  Ns are as follows: Across Conditions = 378, Unjustified Violence + Low ID = 86, 
Unjustified Violence + High ID = 98, Justified Violence + Low ID = 95, Justified Violence + 
High ID = 99. Explicit Guilt (Dichotomized) coded as 0 = felt no guilt, 1 = felt some guilt. 
ID = Identification. For all correlations, p > .05. 
† p = .056 
 
Although measures of guilt were not reliably related to the sacredness of the 
care/harm and fairness/cheating foundations, it is still possible that the experimental 
manipulations influenced the sacredness of these moral foundations. To explore this 
possibility, two separate 2 (unjustified violence/justified violence) x 2 (low 
identification/high identification) ANCOVAs were run. In the first ANCOVA,16 care/harm 
sacredness served as the dependent variable and sex and Skyrim familiarity were included as 
covariates because both variables correlated significantly with care/harm sacredness (for sex, 
r = .28, p < .001; for Skyrim familiarity, r = -.12, p = .024). In this model, there were no 
significant main effects or interactions, Fs < .36, ps > .548. Skyrim familiarity was not a 
                                                 
16 This model was run with and without three extreme outliers (standardized residuals < -3.00) and the results 
did not differ in the two analyses. Because of this, the results including all participants are reported. 
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significant covariate, F(1, 372) = .06, p = .809, partial η2 < .001, but sex was a significant 
covariate, F(1, 372) = 24.77, p < .001, partial η2 = .062. Thus, there was no evidence that 
moral foundation sacredness was affected by experimental manipulations of moral 
disengagement (unjustified violence/justified violence) or avatar identification (low 
identification/high identification). 
A second 2 x 2 ANCOVA was run with fairness/cheating sacredness as the dependent 
variable. In this model, only participant sex was included as a covariate because it correlated 
significantly with fairness/cheating sacredness (r = .14, p = .007), whereas Skyrim familiarity 
did not (r = .05, p = .338). The results revealed that the overall ANCOVA model was not 
significant, F(4, 373) = 1.92, p = .102, partial η2 = .020. Because of this, the results were not 
interpreted further. Thus, there was also no evidence that the experimental manipulations had 
any effect on the sacredness of the fairness/cheating foundation. 
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CHAPTER 8.   DISCUSSION 
 
Explicit Guilt 
It was predicted that players who engaged in unjustified violence would feel guiltier 
than those who engaged in justified violence (a main effect; H1) and that moral 
disengagement (unjustified violence/justified violence) and avatar identification (low/high) 
would interact so that guilt would be highest for players who engaged in unjustified violence 
and were highly identified with their avatar (H2). For explicit guilt, neither of these 
hypotheses was supported by the results of the 2 (unjustified violence/justified violence) x 2 
(low identification/high identification) analysis controlling for sex, Skyrim familiarity, and 
the extent to which participants thought “this is just a game” while playing. However, when 
the avatar identification factor was replaced with a continuous measurement of similarity 
identification (which was successfully manipulated by the avatar identification 
manipulation), then a significant moral disengagement by similarity identification interaction 
emerged. As predicted, participants who carried out unjustified virtual violence were more 
likely to feel guilt when they felt similar to their avatar. Similarity identification had no 
effect, however, on likelihood of feeling guilt for participants who carried out justified virtual 
violence. Thus, there is evidence that avatar identification (specifically similarity 
identification) can magnify the emotional impact of behaving immorally in video games. 
Similarity identification seems to have little effect, however, if participants are behaving 
morally. This makes sense because participants who behave morally have little reason to feel 
guilt, meaning that avatar identification has no emotional response to magnify. These 
findings complement prior research that has found that avatar identification can strengthen 
the effects of video game experiences (e.g., Fischer et al., 2009, 2010; Konijn et al., 2007). 
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Moreover, these results extend the potential moderating effects of avatar identification into 
the moral domain. 
There was also strong evidence for Skyrim familiarity operating as a game-level 
mechanism of moral disengagement: as familiarity with the game increased, the likelihood of 
feeling guilt decreased. This effect occurred regardless of whether the violence was justified 
or unjustified. This result is consistent with the findings of Hartmann and Vorderer (2010) 
and Gollwitzer and Melzer (2012), providing further support for the notion that gamers 
habituate to immoral in-game behaviors, reducing moral relevance of those behaviors. 
Additionally, there was support for the “just a game” variable as a game-level mechanism of 
moral disengagement (as suggested by Klimmt et al., 2006), although this effect was in the 
opposite direction of what was expected and has been observed in previous research 
(Hartmann & Vorderer, 2010). Specifically, for participants carrying out unjustified violence, 
the more they thought “this is just a game” to themselves while playing, the more likely they 
were to have felt guilt. The reversed direction of this effect may be evidence for active 
emotional regulation during gameplay. Specifically, participants who started to feel guilty 
about their in-game behaviors may have attempted to regulate their negative emotions by 
reminding themselves “this is just a game and I shouldn’t feel bad about what I’m doing.” 
However, because the measures of explicit guilt and the extent to which participants thought 
“this is just a game” while playing both referred to experiences during gameplay it is 
impossible to draw clear conclusions about the order in which the effects occurred with these 
data alone. 
It was also predicted that the experimental manipulations would only affect guilt if 
players endorsed the care/harm and fairness/cheating foundations (H3). This hypothesis was 
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not supported. Measures of care/harm and fairness/cheating foundation salience obtained 
outside of the lab did not have significant effects (either alone or in interaction with 
experimental manipulations) on the likelihood of feeling guilt. Thus, there was no evidence 
that the extent to which participants believed it was important not to harm or cheat others had 
any effect on their experiences of guilt during gameplay. Although this finding goes against 
the predictions of MFT (Graham et al., 2012), it should not be taken as compelling evidence 
against the importance of moral foundations in the study of video games and morality for at 
least two reasons. First, tests of this hypothesis were limited to a subsample of 96 participants 
due to unanticipated recruitment difficulties. This severely reduced the sample size and 
consequently reduced the statistical power to detect an effect. Second, the low reliabilities of 
the care/harm and fairness/cheating subscales further reduced the statistical power. Thus, 
further research will be necessary to determine whether the salience of moral foundations 
influences the likelihood of feeling guilty about immoral in-game behavior. 
Implicit Guilt 
 It was predicted that the effects of the experimental manipulations on explicit guilt 
would be the same for implicit guilt. Specifically, I predicted that participants who engaged 
in unjustified violence would exhibit higher levels of implicit guilt than those who engaged 
in justified violence (a main effect; H1) and that moral disengagement and avatar 
identification would interact so that implicit guilt would be highest for highly identified 
players carrying out unjustified violence. Neither of these predictions was supported by the 
data. There was no significant main effect of moral disengagement nor a significant moral 
disengagement by avatar identification interaction. Participants in all conditions selected 
equivalent numbers of hygiene products as most desirable to them at that moment. Thus, 
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there was no evidence for moral cleansing or the “Macbeth effect” found by Gollwitzer and 
Melzer (2012). This could be because the experimental manipulations were not strong 
enough to produce the effect (recall that a floor effect was observed for the explicit guilt 
variable). The null result may also be attributable to procedural differences in the product 
desirability paradigm. Specifically, Gollwitzer and Melzer (2012) provided participants with 
real products to select and take home with them whereas participants in the current study 
were simply shown pictures of five hygiene and five non-hygiene products and asked to 
select the five products that were most desirable to them at that moment. It is possible that 
the effect would have manifested if participants were provided with actual hygiene products 
that could be taken with them. Although replicating the effect in an online survey format 
would have served as a compelling conceptual replication, failing to replicate the effect in the 
present study makes it unclear why the effect was not observed. It is worth noting, however, 
that Zhong and Liljenquist (2006) have observed the Macbeth effect using a survey format, 
but participants were asked to rate the desirability of the presented products instead of 
selecting which products were most desirable. Thus, future research attempting to use a 
product desirability paradigm in a survey format would likely benefit from asking 
participants to rate the desirability of each product instead of forcing them to choose a certain 
number. This is likely to serve as a more sensitive measure. 
 As with explicit guilt, it was also predicted that endorsement of the care/harm and 
fairness/cheating foundations would significantly influence the effect of experimental 
manipulations on implicit guilt (H3). The data did not support this hypothesis. Neither 
care/harm nor fairness/cheating foundation salience had a significant effect on implicit guilt 
(either alone or in interaction with experimental manipulations). Although this is discrepant 
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with the predictions of MFT, as discussed in the explicit guilt section, this null result should 
not be interpreted as compelling evidence against the importance of moral foundations in the 
study of video games and morality. The unfortunately small sample size (N = 96) available to 
test this hypothesis and the low reliabilities of the care/harm and fairness/cheating subscales 
of the MFQ reduced the statistical power of the relevant analyses. Thus, it remains unclear 
whether moral foundations exert an important influence on implicit guilt after game play. 
Moral Foundation Sacredness 
 It was predicted that player experience of guilt would lead to short-term increases in 
the salience of violated moral foundations (i.e., the care/harm and fairness/cheating 
foundations; H4). The data did not support this hypothesis. Neither explicit nor implicit guilt 
were significantly related to the sacredness of the care/harm or fairness/cheating foundations. 
This was true both across conditions and within each of the experimental conditions. Thus, 
there was no evidence for the moral sensitization effect observed by Grizzard et al. (2014). 
Feeling guilty about in-game behavior did not increase the sacredness (or salience) or the 
violated moral foundations. However, given the floor effect for explicit guilt and the fact that 
experimental manipulations had no significant effect on implicit guilt, these results should 
not be treated as strong evidence against the moral sensitization effect. Because most 
participants experienced low levels of guilt, it seems unlikely that they would have felt guilty 
enough to become sensitized to violated moral foundations. Thus, additional research is 
needed to assess the potential for video games to morally sensitize guilty players. 
Limitations 
 The present research suffered from two primary limitations. First, the moral 
disengagement manipulation (unjustified/justified violence) was not strong enough to 
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produce large differences in explicit guilt. All participants experienced fairly low levels of 
explicit guilt and this floor effect made it necessary to dichotomize the explicit guilt variable. 
This dichotomization made the dependent variable less sensitive to variations in explicit 
guilt, making it more difficult to detect the predicted effects. Despite this limitation, 
however, a significant moral disengagement by similarity identification interaction was still 
found using the dichotomized guilt variable. It seems likely that the effect of this interaction 
would have been even stronger if a continuous measure of explicit guilt could have been 
used. Properly utilizing a continuous measure of explicit guilt might also reveal other effects 
that were missed here due to an insensitive dependent variable. Thus, additional research 
would benefit from stronger manipulations of game-induced guilt. 
The current manipulations of moral disengagement may have been weaker than 
intended for several reasons. First, in the unjustified violence condition the human 
opponents, although described as “innocent townspeople,” were armed and armored giving 
them a combative and bandit-like appearance. This combative appearance coupled with the 
fact that the humans attacked players on sight may have been sufficient to justify fighting and 
killing the attackers, thus reducing guilt. Additionally, the bandit-like appearance likely made 
it easier for experienced Skyrim players to morally disengage, because these players likely 
had prior experience killing bandits who are portrayed as evil in the game. Second, in the 
justified violence condition, although participants fought against “unholy, undead creatures,” 
these opponents had a human-like appearance. This may have been sufficient to humanize 
the opponents, leading to higher levels of guilt than intended and further washing out 
differences between conditions. Finally, in both conditions players were given the goal of 
exploring the cave in search of treasure. In retrospect, this goal in itself may have been 
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sufficient to justify the in-game behaviors for some participants. For others, the goal of 
killing any creatures (even unholy, undead ones) for material gain may have felt unjustified. 
Follow-up studies would benefit from avoiding these potential pitfalls. 
The second limitation of the current research was the small amount of participants 
(roughly 25% of the sample) who completed measures of moral foundation salience outside 
of the lab. This was due to an unanticipated recruitment difficulty and severely reduced the 
power to detect any effects of baseline moral foundations on guilt experiences. Although 
losing statistical power to test one of the four hypotheses is regrettable, it was preferable to 
the alternative—being unable to recruit enough participants to test any hypotheses. Future 
research would benefit from a different strategy for obtaining a baseline measure of moral 
foundation salience (as compared to planning on matching up measures from mass testing or 
scale validation sessions). This could be done, for example, by obtaining a measure in the lab 
before experimental manipulations but embedding the measure within other questionnaires to 
reduce suspiciousness and demand characteristics. 
Future Directions 
 The scientific study of video games and morality is still in its infancy, meaning there 
are many unanswered questions. For example, do video games have the power to alter our 
sense of morality? There is some evidence that violating moral foundations in video games 
can increase the salience of those foundations in the short-term if players feel guilty about 
what they have done (Grizzard et al., 2014), but it is unclear what the long-term 
consequences may be. The fact that game-induced guilt is less likely when familiarity with 
the game is high suggests that gamers become desensitized to in-game immoral behavior. But 
does that desensitization carry over into the real-world? Do repeated in-game violations of 
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moral foundations make those foundations less important to us over time? Or do players 
become sensitized to moral foundations that are violated in video games, making them more 
important? To make matters more complicated, the effects may depend on the context in 
which the violations occur. For example, if players are punished for violating the care/harm 
foundation, that foundation may become more salient over time. However, if players are 
instead rewarded for violating the care/harm foundation (as they often are), that foundation 
may become less salient over time. 
Moral disengagement likely interacts with these potential effects in complicated 
ways. For example, even if a person believes it is important not to harm others this belief 
might not matter if that person is morally disengaged (e.g., “it’s important not to harm 
others… unless they are evil”). In addition to potentially altering moral foundations, video 
games might also influence people’s tendency to morally disengage. For example, if video 
game players become comfortable with justifying and carrying out immoral behavior in 
video games does that increase their likelihood of justifying and carrying out immoral 
behavior in the real-world? There is compelling evidence that behaving aggressively in video 
games does in fact “bleed over” into real-world aggression (Anderson et al., 2010). If these 
effects occur with the morally-relevant behavior of aggression, it seems reasonable to suspect 
that they may occur with other morally-relevant behaviors. However, despite the general 
tendency for research to focus on the negative effects of video games (a phenomena that is 
not limited to this domain of research), it is important to acknowledge the great potential for 
positive effects. For example, if players routinely behave morally in video games does this 
increase their likelihood of behaving morally in the real-world? As with aggressive behavior, 
there is convincing evidence that in-game prosocial behavior does “bleed over” into real-
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world prosocial behavior (Greitemeyer & Mügge, 2014). Thus, it seems reasonable to expect 
both positive and negative effects of video games on morality depending on the content. 
Finally, as technology advances it is becoming easier for gamers to identify with their 
in-game avatars in important ways. For example, many games allow for extensive avatar 
customization, allowing people to play as avatars similar to them or avatars that embody the 
type of person they would like to be. Others offer immersive virtual reality experiences 
where players feel as if they are physically present in the game world. Because avatar 
identification has the potential to moderate content effects, it is likely to be important for 
understanding the relations between video game play and morality. For example, if a person 
plays as an immoral character that they identify with, this may increase their likelihood of 
immoral behavior (because they wish to be more like that character). In contrast, if a person 
plays as an immoral character that they do not identify with, this may decrease their 
likelihood of immoral behavior (because they wish to distance themselves from that 
character). 
Conclusion 
The present study integrated video game research concerning moral foundations 
theory, moral disengagement theory, and avatar identification. Results revealed that feeling 
similar to one’s in-game avatar increases the likelihood of feeling guilty about carrying out 
unjustified violence in a video game. In contrast, feeling similar to one’s in-game avatar had 
no effect on the likelihood of feeling guilty about carrying out justified virtual violence. 
These findings suggest that the moral impact of video games can be increased through avatar 
identification. There was also strong evidence that familiarity with the given video game 
decreased the likelihood of experiencing guilt regardless of whether the violence that was 
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carried out was justified or unjustified. This suggests that players habituate to immoral in-
game behaviors as they gain experience with the game. 
There was no evidence for any effect of moral disengagement (unjustified 
violence/justified violence) or avatar identification (low/high) on implicit guilt, although this 
may be attributable to measurement sensitivity. There was also no evidence that endorsement 
of the moral foundations of care/harm or fairness/cheating had any effect on player 
experiences of guilt (although the sample size available to test this hypothesis was much 
smaller than intended). Finally, there was no evidence that player experience of guilt 
increased the salience of moral foundations that were violated in-game, although this null 
effect may be attributable to a floor effect observed on the explicit guilt variable. Future 
research is necessary to provide additional tests of these hypotheses. 
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APPENDIX B.   INFORMED CONSENT DOCUMENT 
 
Title of the Study: Video Games and Product Desirability 
 
Investigators: Johnie J. Allen, B.A. & Craig A. Anderson, Ph.D. 
 
Eligibility Requirements: You must be at least 18 years of age to participate. 
 
Introduction 
This study examines the relationship between video game characteristics and product desirability. We 
believe that certain types of consumers prefer certain types of games and other products. We are 
interested in better understanding which types of games and products people prefer. You are being 
invited to participate in this study because you are a student in Com. Studies 101, Psychology 101, 
230, or 280. 
 
Procedure 
Participation in this study is voluntary. If you agree to be in this study, it will take up to 60 minutes. 
You will receive two SONA credits for participating.  To complete this study, we will ask you to do 
the following things: You will be asked to play one or more of several possible video games. An 
electronic recording will be made of your gameplay. Next, you will be asked to complete a series of 
questionnaires. You may skip any questions which you are not comfortable answering. 
 
Risks 
You will be asked to play one or more video games, and complete a few questionnaires. It is possible 
that some of the content of the games may be discomforting for some. Additionally, some of the 
questions may be sensitive in nature. If you feel uncomfortable with the questionnaires or any other 
tasks, you can stop immediately with no penalty and you will receive credit for your time. Also, you 
may skip any questions or tasks if you do not feel comfortable. 
 
Benefits 
You will receive first-hand knowledge of how psychological research is conducted, which will 
complement information from your psychology class.  It is hoped that the information gained in this 
study will benefit society by improving the understanding of the relationship between video game 
characteristics and product desirability. 
 
Costs and Compensation 
There will not be any costs to you for participating in this study, except for your time spent in the 
laboratory. This study will take up to 60 minutes of your time, for which you will electronically 
receive two SONA credits even if you choose to discontinue participation in the study. Please keep in 
mind that alternative ways to receive course credit are available within each of these classes (Com. 
Studies 101, Psychology 101, 230, or 280).  
 
Participant Rights 
Your participation in this study is completely voluntary and you may refuse to participate or leave the 
study at any time. If you decide to leave the study early, it will not result in any penalty or loss of 
benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. You will also receive a copy of this consent form.  
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Confidentiality 
Records identifying participants will be kept confidential and will not be made publicly available. 
Federal government regulatory agencies and the Institutional Review Board (a committee that 
reviews and approves human subject research studies) may inspect and/or copy your records for 
quality assurance and data analysis. These records may contain private information. Only the research 
team will have access to the data which will be stored in a locked office. The only function of the 
collected data is to assist in the proposed research.  The only identifier will be your University ID 
number which will be removed prior to data analysis. The data obtained from this research will be 
secured on data disks and kept in a locked room only accessible by this research team. If the results 
are published, your identity will remain confidential.  
 
Questions or Problems  
You are encouraged to ask questions at any time during this study.  For further information about the 
study contact Johnie J. Allen at (###) ###-#### or jallen@iastate.edu, or Dr. Craig A. Anderson at 
(###) ###-#### or caa@iastate.edu. If you have any questions about the rights of research subjects or 
research-related injury, please contact the IRB Administrator, (515) 294-4566, IRB@iastate.edu, or 
Director, Office for Responsible Research, (515) 294-3115, 1138 Pearson Hall, Ames, IA 50011. 
********************************************************************************* 
You may or may not choose to participate in this study.  If you choose to participate, please read the 
following statement and acknowledge your voluntary consent by signing and printing your name. 
I hereby consent to my participation in this experiment.  I have been informed and understand the 
purposes and procedures of this study that can be divulged to me in advance.  I understand that my 
participation is completely voluntary and that I am free to withdraw consent and discontinue 
participation at any time without losing credit.  I agree to participate in this experiment as 
described above. 
 
 
Signature of Participant                        Print Name    Date 
********************************************************************************* 
FOR EXPERIMENTER TO COMPLETE: 
I certify that the participant has been given adequate time to read and learn about the study and all 
his/her questions have been answered.  It is my opinion that the participant understands the purpose, 
risks, benefits and the procedures that will be followed in this study and has voluntarily agreed to 
participate. 
 
 
Signature of Investigator or Person Obtaining Consent    Date 
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APPENDIX C. 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR ALL VARIABLES OF INTEREST 
Table 13. 
Descriptive Statistics for All Variables of Interest 
Variable M SD Min Max 
Moral Foundations Salience     
Care/Harm Salience 3.50 .70 2.00 4.83 
Fairness/Cheating Salience 3.46 .58 1.83 4.83 
Authority/Subversion Salience 2.97 .65 1.33 4.33 
Loyalty/Betrayal Salience 3.00 .72 1.17 4.67 
Sanctity/Degradation Salience 2.63 .92 .17 4.67 
Emotion Scales     
Joviality 2.83 1.02 1.00 5.00 
Self-Assurance 3.18 .90 1.00 5.00 
Attentiveness 3.92 .78 1.00 5.00 
Hostility 1.72 .65 1.00 3.67 
Sadness 1.49 .61 1.00 3.80 
Explicit Guilt (Continuous) 1.25 .43 1.00 4.00 
Implicit Guilt 1.91 1.04 .00 5.00 
Video Game Ratings     
Positive VG Experience 4.89 1.69 1.00 7.00 
Negative VG Experience 2.96 1.65 1.00 7.00 
VG Violence 4.45 1.25 1.00 7.00 
Action Pace 3.64 1.41 1.00 7.00 
Competitiveness 2.74 1.51 1.00 7.00 
In-Game Need Satisfaction     
Competence 4.39 1.61 1.00 7.00 
Autonomy 4.70 1.43 1.00 7.00 
Presence/Immersion 3.47 1.20 1.00 6.78 
Intuitive Controls 4.82 1.41 1.00 7.00 
Composite Need Satisfaction 4.06 1.07 1.22 6.56 
Controls & Manipulation 
Checks 
    
Skyrim Familiarity 3.57 2.57 1.00 7.00 
Thought “Just a Game” 4.12 2.04 1.00 7.00 
Thought “Just an Experiment” 2.92 1.71 1.00 7.00 
Fought Nonhuman Creatures 4.67 2.31 1.00 7.00 
Felt Justified 5.38 1.68 1.00 7.00 
Could Identify 3.69 1.94 1.00 7.00 
Avatar Identification Measures     
Similarity Identification 1.91 .86 1.00 4.83 
Wishful Identification 1.85 .85 1.00 4.60 
Embodied Presence 2.33 1.00 1.00 5.00 
Composite Avatar Identification 2.04 .80 1.00 4.24 
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Table 13 continued     
Variable M SD Min Max 
Moral Foundations Sacredness     
Care/Harm Sacredness 6.95 1.23 1.00 8.00 
Fairness/Cheating Sacredness 5.39 1.44 1.50 8.00 
Authority/Subversion Sacredness 4.53 1.73 1.00 8.00 
Loyalty/Betrayal Sacredness 6.25 1.34 1.50 8.00 
Sanctity/Degradation Sacredness 6.11 1.32 1.75 8.00 
Video Game Experience     
Weekly Playtime of VGs 1.67 1.00 1.00 5.00 
Years Playing VGs 9.76 4.78 0.00 20.00 
VG Experience (Composite) 1.00 5.00 1.00 5.00 
Video Game Genre Preferences     
Shooter 3.09 1.43 1.00 5.00 
Action/Adventure 2.52 1.36 1.00 5.00 
Puzzle 2.07 1.17 1.00 5.00 
Strategy 2.18 1.31 1.00 5.00 
Simulation 2.15 1.26 1.00 5.00 
Music & Party 2.13 1.21 1.00 5.00 
Solo Role-Playing 2.47 1.47 1.00 5.00 
Sports 2.66 1.56 1.00 5.00 
MMORPGs 2.05 1.40 1.00 5.00 
Real-World MMOGs 1.30 .63 1.00 5.00 
Fighting 2.01 1.24 1.00 5.00 
Note.   Min = Minimum, Max = Maximum, VG = Video Game, MMORPGs = Massively 
Multiplayer Online Role-Playing Games, MMOGs = Massively Multiplayer Online Games. 
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APPENDIX D. 
CORRELATION MATRIX FOR PRIMARY ANALYSIS VARIABLES 
Table 14. 
Correlation Matrix for Primary Analysis Variables 
 
Note.   N = 96 for all correlations calculated for Care/Harm Salience (MFQ) and 
Fairness/Cheating Salience (MFQ) in the bottom two rows. For these correlations, values 
greater than |.21| are significant at p < .01, and values greater than |.27| are significant at p < 
.001. N = 378 for all other correlations. For these correlations, all values greater than |.10| are 
significant at p < .05, all values greater than |.13| are significant at p < .01, and all values 
greater than |.17| are significant at p < .001. 
